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## **The Trend of Rivalry in Middle East and North Africa States: Culminated Factors and Lessons to Governance Culture of Africa Sub Saharan States**

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### **Abstract:**

*A state of political unrest is one of the contemporary defining features to date. Since the end of Cold War there have been countless conflicts that has caused life misery to the people. Popular striking factors is the increased rates of unemployments, uneven distribution of production and the increased gap between the rich and the poor resulted from what politicians failed to deliver. These among others have fundamentally corroded the ability of the state to care for its citizens. The paper examines the surge of conflicts in MENA reflecting factors spearheaded it, importantly related to posing a lesson to a prolonged governance culture most prevalent in Africa particularly the Sub Saharan region. Due to several challenges related to conflicts in MENA, including demand for constitutional reforms, overstay of leaders into power and lack of interactive leadership system, the paper recommends total redefinition of governance style in Sub Saharan Africa.*

### **1. Introduction**

The political turmoil in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) that started in 2011, has had unalterable transformation not only to the Arab World but to the world at large. Particular, Arab societies and politics do indeed have fixed interconnections and share at least some important traits regardless of their geographical locations (Dalacoura, 2012). Arabs speak same vernacular, with common multiplicity of cultural bonds. In trace of trend for the rivalry in MENA we are gripped to establish such interwoven pattern leading to the acceleration of political uprising spread profoundly in Arab states. Indeed, the impacts of such trend pose a great lesson to other African leaders with the nature of governance tradition existing in most African states. This paper explores the trend of rivalry in MENA by reflecting factors led to fasten the uprising movements which indeed envisages the political culture in Sub Saharan Africa.

### **2. The Backdrop Cases and Associated Factors for Speeding Uprising In MENA**

As a concept *political culture* denotes a broad range of customs, values, beliefs, attitudes and traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance. These cultural caucuses directly and indirectly impair the efficacy of all organs of the State (i.e. executive, legislative, judiciary, bureaucracy, security establishment etc.) and the society at large in the extent to which political stability and democratic governance is assured, nurtured and consolidated (Matlosa, 2003 p2). The political culture we are currently referring to, denotes the way power has been exercised in MENA and how the wind of uprising has affected various parts of the world, most important the Arab states. Not similar but apparently sentiments of chaos resulted from resembling political challenges happening in Arab states have somewhat in connections to what has happened and the current state of political practice in Sub Saharan Africa. Among others, this has prompted this study to revisit cases and the factors spearheaded conflict in MENA as discussed hereunder;

### **3. The Tunisia Episode with Mass Unemployment and Youth Livelihood Insecurity**

The historical background and experience of political movements in MENA possessed a diverse but interdependent nature of political movements. From the inception, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December 2010 in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid the self sacrifice of Muhammad Buazizi had achieved fable significance as the figurative start of the uprisings (International Crisis Group Report, 2012 p3-6). Buazizi put himself on fire in a distressed dispute against humiliation by the police and the feared loss of his livelihood. Emergence of demonstrations erupted and spread to neighbouring cities, led to subjugation but a slow political response from Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's regime. Popular mobilization in Tunisia was largely spontaneous, but sections of the country's main trade union, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), and professional associations subsequently played a part in organizing it essentially standing to voice the right of youth employment correlating justification of Ben Ali into power failing to answer youth unemployed questions (ICG Report, Ibid).

The Police authoritarianism increased but then retreated by 10 January 2011, as the army signaled it no to execute any offense actions against the protesters. As a general strike unfolded on 14 January, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. Within days, a temporary president and national unity government were in place in Tunisia (ICG Report, 2012 p9). The latter included opposition members but was headed by the incumbent prime minister. He was too close to the old regime, however, and political and popular opposition led to his resignation on 27 February. The Beji Caïd Essebsi, who replaced the incumbent prime minister Muhammad Ghannouchi who had no links to Ben Ali engineered the formulation of *supérieure pour la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution, de la réforme politique et de la transition démocratique* in 5<sup>th</sup> April, 2011 (Angrist, 2011) This and other factors such as overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia spurred popular political action in Egypt.

#### **4. The Incident in Egypt with Resistance for Constitutional Amendment**

The political humid and the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia galvanized the political movements in Egypt. The serious protests were classified in 25 January by civil society and opposition groups unanticipated brought out around 20,000 participants (Ghobashy, 2011 p258) Protests spread in Cairo and throughout the country. They gradually mounted, gathering speed with increasing anger whereas on 29<sup>th</sup> January, 2011 President Hosni Mubarak announced a new government. Proving that his son Gamal would not succeed him, he appointed Omar Suleiman, head of the General Intelligence Service, to the vice-presidency. Meanwhile, the protesters were in demand that Mubarak's should step down. The large scale demonstrations against Mubarak's resignation encountered open fire to discontinue the movements. On 11 February Mubarak resigned and transferred his powers to the military. For Six months later he was put on trial, with his sons and key regime figures. Generally, the key needs of the Egyptians were *constitutional amendments including restricting presidential terms of office, limiting anti-terrorism and emergency legislation, and strengthening judicial supervision of elections of which were approved by referendum on 19 March, 2012*. The collective assertion was to write a new constitution that many other African countries are in similar necessity.

#### **5. Libya and Lack of Participatory and Interactive Leadership**

The experience in Tunisia and Egypt pumped the transference of spirit of movement in the rest of the region. Within a short period after Mubarak's fall, protests against Muammar Qadhafi blasted out in Benghazi, Libya's second largest city, and quickly spread 'across the whole of the east and to some parts of the west', although they remained relatively small-scale in the capital, Tripoli (ICG, Report, 2012 p. 28). Ignoring what goods and better quality of majority's life Qadhafi had attained for his people, the need for power sharing and interactive leadership that considers other Libyan was the central demand led to the protest. The rebellion was led by the National Transition Council (NTC). The UN Security Council endorsed military intervention by NATO from March, 2011 but this did not trigger a popular uprising in the West; by early September 2011, after months of apparent deadlock and a war which cost tens of thousands of lives (the figures are as yet unverified), Qadhafi's regime imploded and he himself was brutally killed on 20 October, 2011.

#### **6. Bahrain and Overstay Of the Sunni Monarchy into Power**

In Bahrain, which faced longstanding political conflict between the Sunni Monarchy and a Shi'i majority, protests erupted on 14 February resulting, a few days later, in the police storming Manama's Pearl Square, which was occupied by protesters, and killing seven of them, some asleep in tents. Demonstrations restarted on 21 February, but were met by even bigger pro-government events (Jones and Kerr, 2011).

#### **7. The Saudi Arabia Uprising**

Repression radicalized the movement, which called for a republic and a march on the royal palace on 11 March. King Hamad invited Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces, led by Saudi Arabia, into the country on 14 March to help suppress the uprising and declared a state of emergency (Middle East Report, 2011 p5). In Yemen, following Ben Ali's ouster from Tunisia on 14 January, small-scale demonstrations demanded President Ali Saleh's removal. After Mubarak's fall a month later, protests grew, now being led by a new group of youth and civil society activists. They acted independently of the formal political opposition parties—loosely organized in the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a coalition which included the Islamist Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party—which had initially demanded reform rather than Saleh's overthrow. The JMP started to support the youth protesters' more radical demands but, unlike them, remained open to negotiations with the regime, which continued. On 18 March the killing by snipers of 60 protesters alienated many Yemenis. Nevertheless, Saleh used a combination of repression, counter-mobilization, economic enticements, and promises of political compromise and reform to hang on to power Injured in an attack on 3 June, he fled to Saudi Arabia, but returned on 23 September (Sharekh, 211 p57). Saleh has agreed to hand over power but will continue to be a political player, particularly as his family retains control in the military and security apparatus. In the meantime the threat of open conflict is conspicuous, as an array of internal forces is precariously balanced across Yemen's many fault-lines.

#### **8. Syria and the Demand for Democratic Reform**

The Syrian Civil war is a conflict between its long-serving government and those seeking to boot it out of office. The Assad family has held power in Syria since 1971 (Rodger, 2012). First it was Hafez al-Assad, then Bashar al-Assad.

Unlike many regime leaders in the Middle East, The Assad family is not religiously extreme. They are Alawites, a relatively obscure branch of Islam which is not particularly hard-line. So the people have not been protesting against hard-line Islamists, as happened in other countries which participated in the Arab Spring uprisings (Rodger, Ibid).

The theory led to the war states that demonstrations which mirrored those in neighbouring countries, and which soon led to a security crackdown stands as the main source of war in Syria. More important the culmination of various factors including: Political repression, Discredited ideology, Uneven economy, Drought, Population growth, New media, Corruption, State violence, Minority rule and the Tunisia effect have altogether led to such demonstrations (Manfreda, 2011). In April 2011, the Syrian Army fired on demonstrators and the protests became a full-scale armed rebellion.

### 9. Culture and Governance Tradition in Africa

Culture is undoubtedly a crucial determinant of the history, identity and destiny of any given society (Prah, 2001). The dynamics of a social fabric of any society, therefore, revolve principally around the culture of that society. A renowned modernization theorist acknowledges that culture is currently such a vital force and postulates that due, in part, to globalization, the fundamental source of conflict is likely to be cultural, rather than ideological or economic (Matlosa, 2003).

The centrality of culture in the current global political economy and governance traditions across African continent is worth emphasizing at the onset that the importance of a culture to societal development, identity and destiny is as critical as that of political culture to a political system (Matlosa, Ibid). On top of that, "political culture is one of the most powerful influences that shape a political system. It creates norms – beliefs about how people should behave - and these norms influence social behavior" (Jackson and Jackson, 1997: 98). One of the most significant factors that have enormous impact on the political system and current efforts towards democratic governance in the Sub-Saharan African region is political culture. Political culture has both direct and indirect bearing and variation on political and economic governance processes and as such has influenced to a considerable degree of instability or stability of the political systems in the region.

Looking at governance tradition in Africa, first and foremost high ranked leadership in power is much referred to than earmarking *governance* as an isolation concept. Quite often Africa governance tradition is diverse and unprecedented but yet in crisis for many surrounding regions since the era of many African countries independence. John Maxwell (2011) argues, *everything rises and falls on leadership*, literary referring to the fact that a leader is a determinant of the direction of success and failure. One common and popular norm among others African leadership has been the tendency of refusal of most leaders to leave offices, even when they find themselves incompetent (Kasimila and Nassoro, 2012). This has designated different nature of office departures including the Amin, Mobutu, Banda, Mangistu to mention a few (Kasimila and Nassoro, Ibid). Indeed, the prolonged tendency of power drunkardness of African leaders was far back challenged by many ideologists during and after independence. For instance Robert Jackson and Carl Roseberg, (1980,p16) argued that, *many so called African states are seriously lacking in the essential of nationhood. They are ramshackle regimes of highly personal rule that are severely deficient in institutional authority and organisational capability*. This portray a great deal a prolonged social and political instability and lack of democratic governance of African continent.

A superfluity of literature perceives instability as one of the major challenges for democratic governance in developing societies in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. According to Mandaza, for instance, "the perception is widespread that Africa is not a good business address, thanks to political instability and weak governance" (2000:377). Deeply accounting to wider understanding of the political instability in Africa, Mandaza work as cited in Matlosa's work on political culture and democratic governance in southern Africa, identifies, two outstanding schools of thought in the debate on instability-governance that are (a) institutional functionalism and (b) structuralism. The former explains instability and political violence by focusing primarily, if not exclusively, on the interface between the level of institutionalisation of the state and the degree of political participation by the citizenry. It further gives pride of place to the structural configuration of society and constant contestation over (i) state power (ii) resource distribution and (iii) social stratification based on identity and ideology (Matlosa, 2003:88).

### 10. Institutional-Functionalism

The key advocate of the *institutional-functionalism* as an analytical tool for the understanding of instability and political violence in Sub-Saharan countries is Samuel Huntington who in his *Political Order in Changing Societies* propounded an interesting theory that in societies where political participation is high, yet the process of political institutionalization is low and weak, there is bound to be political instability or what he termed political decay. Huntington perceives political institutionalisation in a Weberian logic as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability over time through a political culture based not on politics of patronage, but on legal-rational norms. Conventional societies are seen as principled more on the culture of patronage politics thus less institutionalized, yet with high levels of political mobilization whereas developed countries are seen to be highly institutionalized and allow high political participation. Instability and political violence is therefore a dominant feature of the former due to the disequilibrium between institutionalization and participation while the latter enjoy stability because of the fine balance between institutionalization and participation. True to its modernisationist origins, this thesis assesses levels of institutionalization and participation through the following dichotomies which approximate the traditional-modern classifications of the classical modernization theorists based on the following sense;

- Adaptability-Rigidity
- Complexity-Simplicity
- Autonomy-Subordination
- Coherence-Disunity

The Huntingtonian theory subsequently suggests that the current problem of political instability and violence in Southern Africa can better be explicated by low levels of institutionalization among SADC countries marked in the main by rigid, simple, subordinate and fragmented state institutions under conditions of high political mobilization and participation of the citizens. A post-modernist institutional-functional paradigm of political crisis in Africa has been advanced by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal

Daloz in their 'Africa Works' in Matlosa's work. It is further understood that, the analysis of these two scholars is simply that the crisis is fundamentally "a crisis of modernity". In this context, states have not institutionalized the governance process, but rather "the political instrumentalization of disorder". Based on these scholars "although there are obviously vast differences between countries in this respect, an argument is leveled on the fact that African states share is a generalized system of patrimonialism and an keen level of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, lack of institutionalization, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal statist economy. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority" (Mandaza, 1996:3).

### 11. The Insight of Rivalry in Sub-Saharan Africa

The first half of the 1990s saw widespread political turbulence across the African continent which can be summarized with reference to a few key political trend. This period marked the increased political competition, over who will govern and take control of the state.

Yet, even states with low population rate in Africa leave alone high populated countries of Africa, in Lesotho marginal political misunderstanding were noticed in 1993 and 1997. The Basotho National Party (BNP), after dismally losing the 1993 elections, proceeded with the charade of refusing to recognize the BCP's election victory. The party engaged in concerted and unsuccessful court battles to unseat the BCP with the claim that the elections were rigged and not free and fair.

The historical political crisis in Namibia and Zambia over the extension of the tenure of the President Sam Nujoma and President Fredrick Chiluba into third term suggests the same tendency by the political elite to have an insatiable 'lust' for power and often not ready to facilitate succession of leadership.

Although Nujoma succeeded and attempted rather abortively a fourth term, Chiluba suffered an irreparable political damage when he ultimately lost both state power and became severely marginalized within the party following the 2001 election that saw him completely eclipsed by the new party leader and president, Levy Mwanawasa. It is also noteworthy that President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi had already attempted twice rather dismally to coax and exhort the Malawian legislature to endorse his political bid for a third term of office by having the constitution amended to give effect to what is clearly self-serving political machination. Similar trends of political culture of violence linked primarily to control over state power are manifest in other parts of the SADC region. The violence that attended the challenge of the 1999 election outcome by RENAMO in Mozambique a year after the event which led to the killing of more than 50 people was certainly more about state power and a subterranean culture that bullets are more important than ballots in solving political differences.

More insights is assessed from numerous military coups including that of Congo in 1960s, overthrow of Nkuruma of Ghana in 1966 and Nigeria of Nnadi Azikiwe in 1966 as well as Ugandan first coup in 1971 against Obote and a bloody period in 1974 for the emergence of Mengistu Haile Marium who later were overthrown by Meles Zenawi to point a few cases. Such crises characterised the *unstopping trend and nature of governance tradition in Africa* that was generally unstable. Basically, largely the whole region of Africa have been with several social and political crisis that even recently, destabilise the continent unevenly.

Relating to the recent crisis phenomenon in MENA, the six cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Syria, where popular uprisings led either to the overthrow of dictators or to serious internal fracturing and contestation, are separated by a sharp divide from the rest of the region, which experienced comparatively minor fallout from those events, although they also pose a concern to the rest of the world undergoing small scale crisis of such nature the six cases serve an important observation. In Morocco and Jordan, ruling monarchs diffused pressures by announcing reform measures. Thus, no part of the world more specific Africa, is isolated from apparently spreading features of the Arab uprising, given the Africa historical posture on governance tradition.

### 12. The Problem Statement

The trend of emergence of Arab uprising in MENA poses a critical and significance point of tutorial to many African states that have similar but diverse norm of power mongering. African governance traditions have been dynamic with some waste experiences that infringe people's rights and discredit popular mass definitions of democracy and development. Although the continent has not been in isolation of various political crises, this nature of Arab uprising and they way it took form has drawn a very unpredictable phenomenon to various states, due to its characteristics taking note the incorporation of majority of youths in all movements.

Constitutional reforms, huge demand for employment and power sharing have been serious demands of the mass popularity against many governments in Africa. The theory in MENA proves to influences similar *revolution spirit* in many parts of the world, where by youth protestors define this moment as the era of "global political awakening". Yet, the violence nature of demand for mass rights from those in powers has been grappled when lenient measures have been intentionally undermined.

Basically, there is no doughty that, the conflict in MENA has posed unstated social, political and all embracing impacts most important deaths. This paper looks at the factors spearheaded the speed of conflict spread in MENA by correlating with underlying key unanswered governance questions that paint the Africa governance traditions.

### 13. Key Lessons to African Governance Tradition

The wider view in this paper underlines the need that, critically, true renaissance is still badly needed in Africa as experiences extracted from the gaps of what MENA leaders had significantly fell short. The wider mass interest presuppose issues of transparenance and good governance, participatory and interactive leadership, upholding of constitutional goals and principles and equitable redistribution of the national cake as well as proof of ethical leadership in the governing systems among other factors.

#### **14. Transparency and Good Governance**

Transparency commands trust and ensures how the government meets the stated objectives and how it responds to the wider needs of the community at large thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction. This is the critical to the people of African continent. A fundamental lesson drawn from the crisis in MENA ignites the shed of light that very seriously, African governance systems not only need transparency and good governance but failure to uprehead into such precious leadership tools, i.e. transparency and good governance, political and social crisis becomes inevitable.

Articles 3 and 4, of the African union emphasise the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights (AU, Constitution, 2007). Indeed, Article 6 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (Treaty), EAC also emphasizes the significance of good governance, including adherence to the rule of law, accountability, transparency, respect for human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities. Article 7 of the establishment treaty of EAC clearly cement adherence to democracy and democratization process not only in their respective states but also in the integration activities (EAC Governance & Protocol Draft, 2007). Although, these declarations have been in almost all states constitution, the practical reality has historically been dwelt in papers rather than in reality. Currently the creed confessed by heads of states should far beyond stand as guidance for all practice of social, political and economic affairs of the states more than the past experience given the state of peace and security in the continent.

#### **15. Participatory and Interactive Leadership**

As a concept, interactive leadership has its roots in participative management approaches, in transformational leadership theories, and in situation - contingent models of leadership. Its links to participative management approaches are quite clear in Judy Rosener's (1990). The role of participatory and interactive leadership goes as far as constructing sense of ownership and fuel patriotism of the citizen to its nation. Tremendously, participatory and interactive leadership as ingredients of good governance have key features that meet the large interests of the people in any nation. These include; Contribution, information sharing where stakeholders are informed about their rights, responsibilities and options. Others features include consultation: where by stakeholders are given the opportunity to interact and provide feedback, and may express suggestions and concerns. Issues of cooperation and consensus building and decision making, partnership in which stakeholders work together as equals towards mutual goals sense of empowerment where there is transfer of control over decision-making and resources to stakeholders landmarks solid foundation of peace and stability of any state across the world. This therefore stands vital and Sub Saharan African states need to mainstream in every aspects of social, political and economic development.

#### **16. Upholding Constitutional Principals and Goals**

Many states in Africa are a constitutional democratic referring to the fact that the constitution is the highest law of the land. Parliaments cannot pass a law which goes against the Constitution. No person, not even the President, is supposed to go against it. The courts and the government stand to uphold constitutional binding. The Constitution itself is protected because it is much more difficult to change than any other law. The Constitution contains the most important rules of most world state political system. It protects the rights of the people inside the country, and it explains their obligations. It defines the institutions of the state, what their powers are, and how they may use their powers. The Constitutions sets out peoples' values, the rights of the people, how Parliament and the other legislatures work, how the national and provincial executives are chosen, and how the courts work to mention a few.

In most cases values of the Constitution across the African continent are centered on human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the promotion of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism - this means that there may be no discrimination on the grounds of race or sex, the rule of law and the Constitution as the supreme law - this means everything must be done according to the law, and the Constitution is the highest law, the right to vote and much more in a multi-party system of democratic government.

However, many leaders in Africa have shown several attempts to downgrade and pervert the constitution into their favour more especially during elections. This has resulted into serious conflicts in most of the states in Africa, Sub Saharan in particular. As the supreme law, upholding it by all means and abiding to its principles and goals calls for a more just and peaceful situation that is desired by many in African continent. Critical mechanisms should be endowed to protect the supreme laws that have been often undermined by African leaders.

#### **17. Equality and Equity Distribution of Production**

Equity is the concept or idea of fairness in distribution, More specifically, it may refer to equal life chances regardless of identity, to provide all citizens with a basic and equal minimum of income, goods, and services or to increase funds and commitment for redistribution. Inequality and inequities have significantly increased in recent decades, possibly driven by the worldwide economic processes of globalisation, economic liberalisation and integration and even grand corruption seen in most of prolonged leaders in power more specifically in Africa. This has led to states 'lagging behind' on the national headline goals and different levels of inequity between states. Based on the idea of moral equality, equity looks at the distribution of capital, goods and access to services throughout the country's economic sphere. Experience in Africa indeed, potray quite a ruthless image where by the haves are few as compared to the haves not. The disparity of wealth and enjoyment of the equal or equivalent gain out of production has all along been uneven. Such phenomenon continues to pose an alert to political instability if the states will continue to ignore key issues of equality and equal distribution of the natural resources.

### **18. Ethics and Accountability**

In most of the countries where there is a severe crisis of legitimacy, ethics and accountability have become important commodity for not only for modern governance but for minimising the likelihood of political crisis that the citizen might endorse. Citizens indeed, expect from politicians and public servants ethical responsible conduct as a panacea of fair treatment and justice beyond performance management systems.

It is argued that, the question of ethics is one that is linked with the history of mankind. Ethics deals with the character and conduct and morals of human beings. It deals with good or bad, right or wrong behaviour; it evaluates conduct against some absolute criteria and puts negative or positive values on it (Raga K and Taylor D, 2010 p10).

Fox Meyer (1995) defines accountability as the "responsibility of government and its agents towards the public to achieve previously set objectives and to account for the public in public" It is also regarded as a commitment required from public officials individually and collectively to accept public responsibility for their own action and inaction. In this case, the burden of accountability rests on each public functionary to act in the public interest and according to his/her conscience, with solutions for every matter based on professionalism and participation (Ssonko, 2010).

Cases of conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa have been embedded with phenomenon of unethical leadership and lack of accountability, thereby worsening trust between the state and the citizen. Arguing on ethical leadership and accountability, Rosberg et al, (1984:421-42) underlined that, If some accounts are to be believed, the culprit in cases of state failure is "bad and/or corrupt leadership" Rosberg leveled that, bad leaders are those that hang on to power while failing miserably to manage the accompanying challenges and contestations. The contestations that frequently spin out of control and threaten public order take various forms among them ethnic and religious antagonism, rivalry for the control of nature's endowments or the so-called "resource curse", interregional and/or inter-personal struggle for power, the clash between the modernizing and the tradition-oriented forces, and in recent years, conflict between the rich and the poor.

### **19. Electoral Management Bodies**

Although it is believed that different sub regions in Africa have made varying degrees of progress in relation to democracy, elections and diversity management in Africa, still several challenges are lying ahead. The challenges include, managing national electoral bodies, freedom of the media and excessive use of power by armed forces. Presenting the report on southern Africa, Le Pere (2012) noted that between 1989 and 2009, there have been over 50 national elections. The more regular conduct of elections has been accompanied by frameworks, principles and guidelines for the conduct of elections by regional governmental and non-governmental bodies, including the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections(2004); the more diverse post election political unrest have been erupting.

Further have been noted that, almost all countries in the region have established electoral management bodies (EMBs) to ensure that elections and their conduct are independent, impartial, professional ethical. However, in practice, this is often compromised by how members of the electoral management bodies are nominated, capacity problems whereby typically, EMBs find themselves with insufficient resources and time to prepare for elections. He concluded by observing that in West Africa, there has been encouraging progress in promoting democracy and managing elections but less so in constructive management of diversity. Throughout the region, and more notably in Nigeria, the admixture of religious, regional and ethnic diversities has presented a toxic cocktail for democracy to be deepened and for credible elections to take place on a sustainable basis.

It is further argued lack of fair and free electoral commissions in Africa will continue to spark post election conflicts as compared to the impact of post elections violence on countries that were thriving around the continent including Kenya, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe. Wider view indicates that, "Electoral violence is a product of uneven playing field amongst political actors and low capacity, credibility and partisanship of electoral institutions, including protection and security services, unfairness in the distribution of electoral resources; use of incumbency power or blatant manipulation of election results," (Lopes,2012). Indeed, many conflicts in a democratic society are not between clear-cut right and wrong, but between differing interpretations of democratic rights and social priorities".

### **20. Managing Mass Media and its Roles**

As it is well-known, mass media plays a major part in shaping not only the public taste but also individual and social endeavours. Media workers are supposed to be balanced and unbiased when describing the parties involved in the conflict especially post electoral conflicts.

The theoretical background to understanding the power of media in shaping peace is related to, among other things, how news is framed. Gitlin explains: 'Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual.' Frames can thus be understood as culturally flavored frameworks that help journalists organize information and package it for their audience.

Tuchman states: "Within the realm of political communication, framing has to be defined and operationalised on the basis of the social constructivism. Mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events." Hence, the framing of news presentation constitutes the very actions that create meaning to events.

In Sub Saharan Africa, the freedom of the media is most cases misused and abused. Media workers have not been keen to forecast the future of the state by taking short-term view of a peace process most cases during post elections. Usually short term view creates a sense of irritation and anxiety. Second, drama and spectacle (bloody pictures, negative statements about antagonists, frustration, hopelessness and death, have been conveying a greater negative impact on the news instead of expressing moderation and stepwise progress. This indeed does not help the peace process perception of the public. Rather it shows the propensity to polarise the parties as well as to frighten the society as a whole.

## 21. Conclusion

The review of trend of rivalry in MENA, brings us at a critical glimpse of the future political unrest currently taking shape around the world. Although concern is much geared in Africa's Sub Saharan, the ongoing phenomenon does not guarantee the region a state of calmness. Generally looking, the whole world is currently prone to diverse nature of political unrest. This however, dichotomize perspectives into interpreting future political dimensions either higher transformative democratic politics or end of it across all regions. At last, having drawn lessons from what has happened in MENA and the world at large, the discourse of political culture in Sub Saharan Africa dwells on the total re-definition of the nature of politics African states wants to practice. On contrary, there are possibilities of the south region to join other conflict regions apart from MENA.

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