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Xenophobia - The Evil Story of the Beginnings of Fascism in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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Abstract:

This paper presents a critical view of the literature on Xenophobia in South Africa with an over-arching objective of presenting the issues as they really are with regard attacks and violence against foreign nationals in South Africa. This paper hypothesizes that the majority of literature on Xenophobia in South Africa has failed to establish the real factors causing Xenophobia. Field work were undertaken in some selected areas known to be “hot spots” of attacks on foreign nationals in the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province for data collection. In addition, literature review and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted to gather more data. The results of this paper revealed that Xenophobia existed in the study area. While attacks and violence seem to be emanating from Xenophobia, results from the ground revealed that the major cause has largely been criminality committed by some foreign nationals on locals forcing reactions from the locals. Foreign nationals should be educated on the dangers of engaging in criminality while in the country before they could be allowed entry into the country, while locals should be educated on international laws governing immigration.

Keywords: Foreign nationals, criminality, Xenophobia, illegal immigrants, police, violence, citizenship

1. Introduction

1.1. Revisiting Objects of Empirical Research

The main objective of empirical research is to encourage debate amongst academicians, promote empirical innovation – especially with research methodologies, develop and unearth new knowledge and to bring that knowledge onto the global stage through publication of the outcome or otherwise. Empirical research might be pure affirmation, corroborative, collaborative or independent. In fact, some researchers concede that they represent certain interests in their literature. Therefore, empirical research will not be ruled absolute – there is need to revisit through critical postulations to affirm, corroborate, consolidate, refute or challenge certain positions with solid argumentations to encourage scholarly interchanges. There remains that need of “empirical research stands alone postulations” to improve the objectives of empirical research. In the case of Xenophobia literature in South Africa, the “findings have been broadly similar, focusing restrictively on resource strain, and nationality and processes of “othering” as cause of Xenophobia” (Duffield, 2009). From this approach emanates a “generalised impression that all South Africans are Xenophobic” (Lubbe, n.d) whereas the number of Xenophobic population in the country is considerably far lower than what has been made to look like (Mafukata, 2015a; Lubbe, n.d).

This paper is meant to promote “empirical research stands alone postulations” in order to challenge emerging trends of affirmations, collaborative and corroborative similarities in social science research as Duffield (2009) conceded. This paper is a departure from absolutism, corroboratism and consolidatism that seem to have infiltrated modern social science research – especially on the issue of Xenophobia in South Africa. This paper is not meant to be antagonistic neither apologetic but to vigorously challenge certain “empirical” positions which have evolved to be rather “unempirical” biases based on pure speculations. This paper has no intended malaise on the literature it criticises but only interests itself with promotion of objective empiricism. This paper postulates issues on literature commenting on Xenophobic tendencies in South Africa – especially after the events of May 2008. The basic point of departure is that the extent of the Xenophobic issues in South Africa as espoused in a number of emerging literature in its current form deserves one more critical empirical revisit. At some point in life, the world is always faced with something difficult to resolve; this could be an Ebola outbreak in West Africa, colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, the Syrian and Egyptian civil tensions, the massacre of innocent children in Denmark, amongst others. In the process, everybody tries hard to respond to these global challenges. Amongst the ills faced by humanity the world over, Xenophobia and other forms of violations and prejudices by humans against other humans are some of the critical dilemmas needing vociferous eradication.

To resolve global Xenophobia, need the world have to steer a war – the type of the British Pihellenes which the British steered in the United Kingdom “to save the Greeks from extinction at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s?” or to stage the 1860 Napoleon the 3rd French legions war type to save Syrian Christians from the rampant Druze? (O'Donnell, 2014). This posit is to show

that it will most certainly need some concerted efforts to resolve issues of Xenophobia and socio-economic prejudices against foreign nationals – precisely in South Africa where such incidences seem to be on the rise – from May 2008 at least. While there are a plethora of social challenges which the rest of Africa is currently experiencing, from terrorism and subsequent genocides propagated by religious-cultural groups such as the Boko Haram in Nigeria for example and many other environmental deficiencies; all with devastating negative impact on Africa's industrial development and economic growth agenda, to ethnic-tribal civil wars that threaten civil cohesion in the Great Lakes Region for example, devastating famines endangering production of food, astronomical debts of African states in global political economy and endemic political and bureaucratic corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa that wastes billions of monetary resources which could have been critical for the region's infrastructural and technological development on the one hand (Lim, 2011), Xenophobia and prejudices against foreign nationals have received much weird and ferocious attention, attacks and commentaries – especially on South Africa (Mafukata, 2015b). On daily basis, opportunistic attacks and violence and other forms of prejudices against foreign nationals are increasingly escalating into a socio-economic nemesis of the South African government and citizenry at large – especially in the informal entrepreneurship sub-sector of the economy where massive displacements and torture are meted out to foreign nationals on daily basis – especially in urban townships (Charman and Piper, 2012; Hicks, 1999). Despite all these, literature masquerading as having had found the causes of these prejudices, and in addition holding irrefutable solutions keep on emerging. Unlike this literature postulating to have found the real causes of Xenophobic attacks of foreign nationals by locals in South Africa, this paper instead departs its investigation from the views expressed by Matunhu (n.d) who posited “little is known about the real causes of Xenophobic attacks” and other prejudices against foreign nationals in South Africa, the view which ironically Hicks (1999) subscribes to. To argue its case, this paper hinges its logic on literature review – with a critical approach to its analysis. In addition, the study employs qualitative data obtained from wide-based stakeholders collected through intertwined set of instruments and methodological approaches. Finally, the paper presents supportive case studies collected and built from real life situations and experiences of various stakeholders in different places; towns and villages in order to ensure representativity of the case studies. The main objective is to set a scenario which will facilitate the study to answer these two critical research questions:

- What is the real cause of Xenophobic tendencies and prejudice against foreign nationals in South Africa?
- What is needed to be done to curb and better manage the situation?

The over-arching purpose of this study is to alert stakeholders of the South African Xenophobic tendencies and other related prejudices against foreign nationals on the crucial importance of locating empirical and policy debate arguments in the correct context of this social dilemma without having to be predictive, interpretive, grandstanding, pre-defensive, and/or biased. The empirical and policy debate pattern followed in many a literature on this dilemma displays advocacy supported by activism for anti-foreigner persecution and prejudice by South Africans. At one point, when going through this kind of literature, one could be persuaded to go the Archie Mafeje protestations and lamentations based on protest against biased writing on African issues – anthropology to be precise, by non-African writers. Mafeje protested “Anthropology in Africa needs to be abolished on grounds that Whites studying Blacks replicated racial inequalities” In Francis Nyamnjoh's view, some kind of these writers “encounter an elephant but see only a tail, a leg, or a trunk and make no picture of the entire animal” (Niehus, 2013). It is convincing that some commentators of Xenophobia in South Africa see no entire picture of prejudices of foreign nationals in South Africa except blatant violation of foreign national by paranoid South Africans. This will not resolve the problems. However, in its quest to present matters as they are on the ground, this paper does not seek to be vindictive but to present empirical evidence which could facilitate for improved responsibility and accountability for stakeholders seeking amicable resolves to the problem. The hypotheses formulated for this paper are that:

- Foreign nationals have unrealistic socio-economic expectations and demands on South Africa – especially the country's government social security system
- Some literature of Xenophobia and prejudice against foreign nationals in South Africa is biased and lacks empirical substance
- There are tendencies of Xenophobia and prejudice manifesting through attacks and violence against foreign nationals in South Africa
- The tendencies of prejudice manifesting through attacks and violence against foreign nationals in South Africa are not necessarily driven by anti-foreigner sentiments amongst South Africans
- Some of these attacks and violence could be explained by criminal activities committed by foreign nationals against South Africans
- These Attacks and violence also emanate from “violent entrepreneurship”
- Opportunistic criminality drives some desperate South Africans to pounce on vulnerable foreign nationals
- Foreign nationals are an integral socio-economic part of the South Africa citizenry
- The economic contribution – especially that foreign nationals create employment for South Africans is flawed and grossly exaggerated and taken out of context

2. Review of Literature on Xenophobia and Prejudices against Foreign Nationals in South Africa

2.1. The Events of May 2008 “Xenophobic Attacks and Violence” in South Africa

There is currently enormous growth of empirical and press literature on Xenophobia and prejudice against foreign nationals in South Africa – especially after the events of May 2008 when some foreigners were killed and some displaced (Hungwe, 2012; Isike and Isike, 2012; Koenane, 2013; Konanani and Odeku, 2013; Mafukata, 2015a; Mafukata, 2015b; Skinner and Crush, 2015; Valji, 2003). Most of this literature postulate that such violence and attacks of foreign nationals living and working in South Africa – especially

those in the townships emanate from the hatred which South Africans have towards foreign nationals. Some of these literature (Duffield, 2009; Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010; Hungwe, 2012; Isike and Isike, 2012; Koenane, 2013; Konanani and Odeku, 2013) postulate that the causes of the “hatred” of foreign nationals is informed by dubious, unfounded allegations, rumours, ill-conceived perceptions propagated by the electronic media and the press, populist politicians wanting to score political points by exploiting the fears of the citizens while at the same time raising their public profiles where it matters, ignorant South Africans who are lagging behind in terms of inter-culturality and multi-culturality in post-colonial Africa and pure paddling of public lies about foreigners in South Africa. Some of this literature (Isike and Isike, 2012)) argue that South Africans were Afro-phobic because their Xenophobia is mainly directed towards other Africans rather than other nationalities from elsewhere. On the one hand there is literature (Hicks, 1999; Muzvidziwa, 1998) even going to an extent of arguing that some South Africans claim that foreign nationals bring foreign religions and cultures into South Africa, were criminals, practice witchcraft and ritual murders to extract human body parts to bring luck to their businesses, sick – bringing diseases over the borders to the country, taking South African women from them, illegally benefiting from various government social service dispensation – especially government grants and low-cost housing, taking over informal business space and market, and so forth. Hicks (1999) go on to call South Africa “a harsh climate of Xenophobia...a vestige from the apartheid era” while Valji (2003) calls the country “the evil story of the beginnings of fascism”. From these postulations, it is evident that issues of Xenophobia in South Africa are deep and challenging for immediate resolution before something explodes.

Despite concessions by some literature such as Hicks (1999) who opined that the causes of Xenophobia in South Africa are, and remain largely illusive, some of the reviewed literatures demonstrate desperation to find the causes, and to provide solutions to Xenophobia in South Africa. There is a pensive mood of pessimism on the attitude of South Africans on foreigners as literature after literature postulate the inhumane “Blanket” Xenophobia which has infected every South African (Lubbe, n.d) – politicians and bureaucrats also not spared from venomous socio-political educationing of South Africans – by the supposed better civilized “other Africans”. Simply put, some immigration activists and philanthropists such as Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) opine that South Africans have suffered social and moral decay from apartheid, and they have to be therefore taught human behaviour in rehabilitation to multi-cultural integration of the global world they have been out of for decades – supposedly through South Africa's international sanctioning and isolation otherwise. The postulations are that the rehabilitation and integration has to be the responsibility of the supposedly other advanced Africans who have already defeated colonialism long before South Africa could defeat apartheid. “Other Africans” are portrayed as highly and far more civilized than South Africa with regard multi-culturalism, inter-culturalism, tolerance of others and globalisation amongst others that at all cost the “other Africans” respect human life and “peoples from elsewhere” This portrays South Africa the sole custodian of Xenophobia in the continent.

2.2. *Xenophobia Elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Zambia*

The former acting president of Zambia, Guy Scot is on record saying he hated South Africans, and that South Africans were backwards in terms of Africaness. Guy Scot spoke as a Zambian and a Zambian official – and from that point, speaking on behalf of the people of Zambia. Guy Scot was saying he harbours Xenophobia against South Africans. In his utterances, Scot had down-played the fact that he could hurt diplomatic relations between his country and South Africa. However, Guy Scot's assertions were addressed diplomatically between Zambia and South Africa but his sentiments did not disappear with the diplomatic process. Scot's assertion might dispel postulations that peoples from the rest of the continent were unable to be Xenophobic because apparently the transition from colonialism to supposed democracy and civilisation has made them better humans. In Zambia in fact, the so-called anti-Chinese sentiments by Africa in general, and Zambia in particular were said to be made very strong because of displayed arrogance and maybe “hatred” of Chinese – especially by the then opposition presidential candidate Mr Michael Sata who rhetorically opined that “Zambia has become a province of China, and the Chinese are the most unpopular people in the country because no one trusts them” and other sentiments such as “The Chinaman is coming just to invade and exploit Africa” From the Sata assertions on China and the Chinese in Africa in general and Zambia in particular, it could be postulated that some references are made out of defence for human rights against perceived abuse by certain members of society – Chinese in the case of the Sata opportunistic political rhetoric. On the one hand, some could opine the Sata rhetoric as “hatred” directed towards exploitative “dissimilar” “others” - again, the Chinese in the case of Zambia. These would be those who look at this critical social anomaly as Xenophobic. Evidently, whatever the reaction of the public might be, it is there to an average reader and those who study Africa to see that “there are always preceding circumstances to any event” (O'Brien et al., 2004). The Chinese had provided the precedence that triggered the public anti-Chinese uproars, negative sentiments and “Xenophobic” assertions by some sections of the Zambian citizenry largely because of the Chinese' exploitative nature of their labour practices – especially in the mining sector (Lim, 2011). Evidently, as opined by Lim (2011), the Sata rhetoric is preceded by a contestable Chinese human rights abuse sentiments on Zambians – especially mining workers whom they grossly underpaid, and the Chinese attitude of China's social role in Zambia – especially the fact that the Chinese were inconsiderate to the plight of so many unemployed Zambians by bringing their own employees even for petty jobs which could have simply gone to unemployed Zambians but kept such jobs for themselves. Before commenting on the anti-Chinese sentiments in Zambia, it therefore becomes fundamentally imperative to inquire “What is it that makes Zambians develop anti-Chinese sentiments in Zambia?” Rushing to establishing the cause of the anti-Chinese rhetoric would not stop the challenge. In the South African “Xenophobia” dilemma, most literature failed to employ this crucial point of departure to seeking solution – instead resort to a more confusing outcome.

2.3. *Some Critical Postulations on Xenophobia*

The assertion, “there are always preceding circumstances to any event” by O'Brien et al.(2004) as mentioned earlier had to be the departure point of the Xenophobia debate in South Africa. This might have greatly assisted the understanding of the events of the May 2008 attacks and violence on foreign nationals in South Africa. What is evident from the majority of the Xenophobia literature on South Africa however is that in the process of the debate on Xenophobia in South Africa, some of this literature has resorted to speculations – especially on the causes of Xenophobia and goes on to provide what Bond and Manyanya (2002) would call “formulaic solutions” to the problem. The desperation has made some literature discard empirical authenticity, and credibility affirming the assertion Bond and Manyanya (2002) presented that there are times when academic biases are to be acknowledged – especially where views are not necessarily based on research evidence. In fact, it cannot be entirely and sufficiently argued that social commentators are always bias-free. For instance, when a commentator writes and argues with a political mandate and when the same writes and argues with an empirical mandate, the outcome is reasonably expected to be different. This assertion is evident from Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) where the authors are reasonably not expected to have a different view from the objectives of an activist-cum-philanthropic advocacy argumentation embedded in the organisation(s) they represent on issues of Xenophobia in South Africa. This assertion could have been the case with Skinner and Crush (2015). However, for an ordinary citizen who continues to suffer realistic criminality perpetrated by foreign nationals, the line of argumentation might be different. In support of this assertion, Mafukata (2015) and O'Brien et al. (2004) opined that in telling a story, it is often highly probable that “whoever does the telling will have a point of view” but it has to be noted that often a point of view might not necessarily be the story (Mafukata, 2015). In fact, Mafukata (2015) further reasoned thus “it is not uncommon that qualitative researchers lack an opinion in the social sciences” It is evident that the majority of literature on Xenophobia in South Africa (Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010; Skinner and Crush, 2015) mostly display the views of the commentators rather than the actual events on the ground. How does Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) venomously as they try to do in their article explain their biased position of foreign nationals being victims of criminality by South Africans to a family that has been harassed and tortured almost seven times in one year, and in their home by foreign nationals? How possible is it for the victim in this regard not to develop perceptions and ill-feelings about the perpetrators – in this case basing such ill-feelings on dislike of their violators and tormentors? It is provocative to the sufferer and victim of criminality perpetrated by foreign nationals to be emotionally coerced and harassed to believe that the victim's experience stems from “myths about foreigners” as opined by Skinner and Crush (2015). The dimensions brought by this paper assist biased commentators such as Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) and Skinner and crush (2015) to objectively look into issues of violence against foreign nationals in South Africa.

From that point of uncontrolled and unmanageable criminality amongst foreign nationals perpetuated to locals – in their own homes through perpetual robberies, rapes and housebreakings amongst others, ordinary citizens who have nothing to do with draconian immigration laws by the South African state, “bureaucratic violence” (Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010) and state immigration control systems non-compliant to international laws of immigration rise to protect themselves against foreign nationals' criminal insurgence. Within this context, emanate public call for foreign nationals to be denied entry into the country and other several mechanisms which would prevent “free-for-all” entry into South Africa for foreign nationals. In demanding so, ordinary South Africans are not expressing any hostility towards foreign nationals but advocating their rights not to be violated in their own country and homes. That there has been an increase of criminality perpetrated by foreign nationals in South Africa is a fact, not perception. Policy makers should consider that playing “denialism” and making assumptions, and trying to down-play criminality perpetrated by foreign nationals in South Africa would not improve the current state of affairs with regard violence, Xenophobia and related prejudices against foreign nationals. The line of reasoning adopted by commentators such as Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) and Skinner and Crush (2015) which seeks to “depict foreigners as survivors of Xenophobia and nationals as perpetrators of the violence” (Matunhu, n.d) and foreign nationals as innocent hard workers victimised by mythical South Africans (Skinner and Crush, 2015) is doomed for failure from the start as a strategy to uprooting violence and Xenophobia against foreign nationals in South Africa.

2.4. *Finding Solution to Attacks, Violence on Foreign Nationals and Xenophobia*

The way forward is to approach this highly sensitive, emotional and contentious issue from a different line of argumentation. In fact, international immigration law already opines that public education of communities on the rights of foreign nationals; be they legal, refugees, asylum seekers is the most effective way to go. Certain stereotypical tendencies and behaviours existing in society which promote suspicion, fear, hatred and perceptions that foreign nationals are a source of cheap labour (Matunhu, n.d) have to be entirely removed from society through intensified public education. It is critical that the South African public be discouraged from vigilante justice against suspected criminal foreign nationals because this promotes public violence against some innocent foreign nationals while exacerbating Xenophobia which furthermore orchestrates witch-hunt of foreign nationals – in some cases basing such violence on hearsy, rumours and unfounded allegations (Skinner and Crush, 2015). Within this scope of public education on foreigner rights, the target should be intensified to educate foreign nationals also on the consequences of criminality - especially in volatile environments such as South Africa. The issue is that policy makers should not desire to absolve foreign nationals from the criminality they commit on South Africans while on the same time portraying the victims of these crimes as criminals. Instead of being naively coerced by the Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) and Skinner and Crush (2015) opined sheer ignorance of the actual reality on the ground to try convince the South African public constituency on the contestation that “migrants are victims more than perpetrators of crime” in South Africa, a better policy approach might assist the cause of uprooting the anti-foreigner rhetoric in the South Africa public – whatever the cause might be.

The way to go might have to be the postulation of Matunhu (n.d) who argued that “little is known about the real causes of xenophobic attacks” in South Africa. South Africans must desist from incorrect persuasions advocated by Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) for

instance seeking to pole-vault their constituency to believe that South Africa is running a wanton anti-foreigner crusade “erroneously blaming immigrants for crime”, and the unfounded allegations of Skinner and Crush (2015) of a non-existent witch-hunt of a hard working legion of foreign nationals in South Africa who instead grow the economy while unequivocally creating employment for the South African public. Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) are however supported in their view by Hicks (1999) who posited thus “consequently, many South Africans have concluded that immigrants are committing crime” Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) further castigates South Africa for its lack of political and bureaucratic will to implement “an effective system for processing non-nationals seeking to enter the country” rather than focusing “on protecting the border and limiting the number of people who could enter” the country.

However, Hicks (1999) tries to explain South Africa's response to prioritising immigration post-liberation when asserting that South Africa “had little patience to address the needs of immigrants”. Contrary to the theory espoused by Hicks (1999) that South had lacked guts to address the needs of immigrants post-liberation, the view of this paper is that did not have to show emergency on addressing issues of immigration because of the country's immediate focus and prioritisation of the socio-economic emergencies in the country affecting the majority of the citizenry. Such socio-economic emergencies were created and sustained during apartheid, and affecting the broader section of its population – not what appeared to be emergencies in other countries. The assertion by Hicks (1999) undermines the basis of the South African liberation struggle and the constitutional obligation of the Republic to its citizenry. South Africa's mandate and priority became its citizens, not immigration. On its liberation, it would have been obviously strange of the new government to, as a matter of emergency prioritise cross-border issues ahead of the genuine socio-economic concerns of its public. South Africans needed better lives in terms of housing, water supply, electricity, access to equal education and health care, not immigration. Blatantly, for an average South African, the country did not engage in the liberation struggle against apartheid to, as a matter of fact, primarily open the borders to other Africans but to improve the lives of the South African people. In the case of South Africa, immigration issues therefore were secondary, not first priority. The urgency of dealing with immigration as opined and advocated for by Hicks (1999) and Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) undermines this imperative – in fact the suggestions are strangely hypocritical. The simple thing which South Africa did post-liberation was to first and foremost prevent further deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of its disadvantaged Black majority who were for years been racially excluded from mainstream formal economy by apartheid. Secondly, South Africa had to react to the prevailing conditions affecting the majority of the people which were appalling post-liberation. Thirdly, the focus was to rebuild the society using every resources available at government disposal. In so doing, the South African government was motivated by what O'Donnell (2014) calls “sovereignty as responsibility” of a state whose obligation is to protect its citizens from all sorts of violations. The assertion “States are no more than instruments whose inherent function it is to serve the interests of their citizens as legally expressed in human rights” might assist critique commentators to South Africa's priorities post-liberation – especially with regard immigration issues. The posit is that the new post-liberation South African government had to be accountable to its domestic constituency.

The Hanekom and Webster suggestions and Skinner and Crush (2015) propositions are disastrous to developing a functional instrument to fight violence against foreigners and where it exists, Xenophobia in South Africa. It is highly contestable for an ordinary citizen who is exposed to, and also resides within foreigner perpetrated criminality in their place of residence on daily basis to buy into the assertions of some literature – in particular Hicks (1999) and Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010). Claims of criminality committed by foreign nationals is not grandstanding by the South African public in a frenzy anti-foreign national rhetoric informed by public superstition, political quest to promote nationalism and mythical tendencies as opined by Skinner and Crush (2015) amongst others. Evidence presented elsewhere in the discussion of this paper would prove that the guess work by commentators of prejudice on foreign nationals in South Africa opining a simulated criminal scenario by South Africans who falsely accuse foreign nationals of criminality is empirically baseless and misleading. To the contrary, Lekaba (2014) instead reported that the so-called Xenophobic attacks and violence which broke out in Soweto towards the end of 2014 were sparked by criminality of the foreign nationals shopkeeper who shot and killed a young man aged 14 years old over a burglary that had taken place in the foreigner's shop earlier. In protest, locals rioted against foreign nationals. A similar incident also took place in Thohoyandou town in the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province. In mid-February 2015, a Zimbabwean national killed a South African nationals over dispute over little money collected from a customer at a car park. The public revolted in protest.

Both Hicks (1999) and Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) demonstrate incapacity of literature to deal with the reality facing ordinary South Africans who are exposed to heinous criminality on daily basis. Portraying South Africa as a continuing apartheid state supported by its mythical citizens and apartheid-form of political systems – especially politicians and bureaucrats to perpetuate criminal acts of Xenophobia against assumed innocent foreign nationals is equivalent to saying foreign nationals were incapable of being criminals whereas South Africans were capable of being thoughtfully violent and criminal against foreign nationals. Hicks (1999) backs this assumptive repertoire from an erroneous insinuation that “the majority of South Africans have had little or no contact with immigrants” Obviously, Hicks (2009) seriously lacks understanding of issues of immigration and migration in South Africa – especially pre-liberation. Issues of immigrants and migration have been part of the lives of ordinary working class Black South Africans as far back as the exploration of copper, coal, gold and diamond mining in South Africa – especially in the Witwatersrand area, Kimberly, and other areas. Hundreds of thousands of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi nationals for example lived and worked with foreign nationals on daily basis. Trace this also in the sugar cane plantations of Natal. Despite different nationalities of these migrant workers in the mines, interactions have been cordial within the space of different cultures and languages. However, these interactions took place and were cordial within issues of differentiations and similarities in terms of ethnic and tribal orientations. Such orientations never for once manifested into the socio-economic dynamics affecting relations between foreign nationals and locals as is the case in post-liberation South Africa. Evidently, there existed during those

interactions, factors that could have polarised one group from the other, but in one way or the other, issues that would have caused “social distances” were co-operatively traversed by both parties to create lasting relations which were accommodating for ethnic-tribal diversity of the mine workforce. Interactions created trust for each other while removing suspicions. Mutual trust lubricated interactions of these two diverse communities. This is social capital needed in today's Xenophobic South Africa to promote social cohesion between foreign nationals and the locals. Bratton et al. (2005) explain in detail issues of harnessing social capital to foster social cohesion in diverse societies.

The postulations of Hicks (1999) which depicts South Africans as being backwards in terms of African immigration and migration is corroborated by Hanekom and Webster's postulations that law enforcement agencies such as the police in South Africa “rely on procedures that are dramatically similar to apartheid policing practices” however being strengthened by “the government's refusal to act” while promoting anti-foreigner sentiments to the public on the one hand which promotes the notion “that non-nationals lacked importance and did not deserve to have their rights respected” Within these insinuations, Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) back their argumentation by citing selected references ascribed to prominent politicians such as the late Minister of Defence Mr Joe Modise, a certain unnamed Minister of Home Affairs – whom Hicks (2009) later distinguishes as Inkosi (Chief) Mangosuthu Buthelezi and a Mr Johan Steyn who was a Senior Police Superintendent to prove South Africa's obsession with Xenophobia and violation of foreigner rights. According to Hicks (1999) and Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010), Chief Buthelezi's statement in parliament “if we as South Africans are going to compete for scares resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)” is highly inflammatory to lobbying South Africans to hate foreign nationals, and therefore resultantly Xenophobic.

What is it that is Xenophobic in this statement? It is a truthful assertion of reality because the sentiments of this statement are true reflection of South Africa's socio-economic position at that time. South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is with resource limits whether the South African government has wishes to the contrary. In fact, in the 2015 state budget speech by the Minister of Finance, this assertion had been well articulated. Minister Nene said to parliament and the nation “Today's budget is constrained by the need to consolidate our public finances, in the context of slower growth and rising debt...on the other hand, our development path is limited by the resource constraints of the current economic outlook” (Nene, 2015). That South Africa could cater for its citizens and everybody from the continent wanting to come into the country on a “free-for-all” immigration system is illusion, utopianism and blatant exaggeration expressing wishful thinking. Already, as Minister Nene indicated, South Africa has a social grant bill which has approximately 16.4 million beneficiaries by December 2014, and this number is expected to grow in the new financial year. The current budget had to be increased by a further R7.1 billion to cater for all the social grant programmes catering for various groups of the citizenry (Nene, 2015). The insinuations posted by the critiques of the South African social welfare systems with regard immigrants suggest sentiments which are in fact anti-growth and anti-development of the country. It is evident that when one comments on issues from elsewhere far from reality on the ground, does so over-zealously motivated by sentiments of activism and advocacy for certain targeted objectives. Minister Nene's budget speech shows reality of issues, and if the Minister's sentiments were expressed from an assumed South Africa's Xenophobic tendencies to exclude foreign nationals from the country's economic scenario, such motivations lack empirical evidence to the contrary. Foreign nationals have Utopian beliefs of a South Africa which is “a land of milk and honey”

Inkosi Buthelezi's statement never diverts criticism of government by the public on its failure to fulfill public expectations to immigrants – especially with crime issues as opined by Hicks (1999). It is a fact that South Africa has limited resource capacity (Matunhu, n.d) to fulfill its RDP mandate – and coupled with issues of an increasing demand rising through immigration, such challenge could be escalated. It is said that the majority of cities such as Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Nelspruit, Polokwane and Pretoria to mention a few continue to receive millions of foreign nationals in a given year. There are various socio-economic complexities emanating from this growth in population, and to cater for this population and still have meaningful output of the RDP within resource limitation base the country has, might be an impossible dream. That is the message in chief of the Inkosi Buthelezi's assertion. Although it is common of politicians to exploit the fears of the citizens (Berton, 2013) to gain opportunistic support by encouraging Xenophobic tendencies, Chief Buthelezi's parliamentary statement never sought to incite the public to object to legal immigrants being in the country. Commentators should at least know that, contrary to this, and the country's challenges, the South African Immigration Act already has provided for temporary residents, employed; studying and foreign nationals with family in South Africa to be in the country with all the benefits of immigration in terms of international statutes. In addition, foreign nationals are protected against possible exploitation by employers while in South Africa, and government therefore demanding that possible employers should “produce certification that the salary and benefits being offered are not inferior to those prevailing in the relevant market segment for citizens and residents” (Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010). Maybe this is not enough, but to showcase a posture undermining the efforts of government in this regard by quoting irrelevant press clips to politicise and complicate a simple parliamentarian assertion by an honest politician – with regard the RDP matter - without providing authentic proof to the contrary is being opportunistic and empirically chauvinistic to the extreme.

2.5. *Speculative Assumptions of Xenophobia Literature in South Africa on Socio-Economic Value of Immigrants*

Policy makers should always remember that literatures wanting to promote certain organisational objectives and viewpoints rather than empirical positions are usually biased - hinging on speculative assumptions. Within this context, in some cases, some wild claims with no empirical material substance are made in the process. For example, press literature such as Skinner and Crush (2015) are overloaded with statements such as “the facts show” foreigners create employment for South Africans, and in addition grow the economy. Skinner and Crush (2015) further argued that foreign nationals are “celebrated in many countries for their contribution to

economic growth and employment creation” The celebrations and the contribution of the foreign nationals into the economies are presumably in other African economies apart from South Africa. Existing evidence to the contrary is that in most cases, foreign nationals' contribution in the economy are instead questioned and doubted in countries such as Gabon, Congo and Zambia for example. In Zambia for example, Whitaker (2005) reported that citizens and government officials have instead become increasingly hostile to immigrants citing negative effect on resources and the criminality they bring into the country. Zambians are known to be irritant of the Chinese – and this is expressed by the sentiments of the former late president of Zambia, Mr Michael Sata (Li, 2011). To the extreme, those perceived as foreign nationals are also excluded from certain socio-political matters such as competing for political office in some countries. Africa has had more deportations of the so-called non-citizens based on nationality and politics of exclusions and inclusions with regard political positions competed for than any other place in the world (Whitaker, 2005). On their submission, Skinner and Crush (2015) however fail to back their postulation by meaningful statistics to the effect, or even to identify where foreign nationals are celebrated for advancing the cause of economic growth – especially with regard Sub-Saharan Africa. Skinner and Crush (2015) argue that foreign nationals – especially through informal business contribute to economic growth of the country because they pay Value Added Tax (VAT) on purchased services and goods, that they grow the formal economy because they bought from this sector and also paid rentals to locals for business spaces. The obvious, which is not acknowledged by Skinner and Crush (2015) is that the biggest chunk of the public spending budget in South Africa for example – especially in 2015, which Nene (2015) shows on the one hand that the budget is from Personal Income Tax (PIT) which contributes approximately R393.9 billion followed by Value Added Tax (VAT) at R283.8 billion; Corporate Income Tax (R202 billion); Customs and excise duties (R76.1 billion); fuel levies (R55.7%) and other (R69.8 billion). Apart from the smaller number of the legal immigrant population living and working in South Africa compared to the overall South African economically active population, how big is the contribution of the illegal immigrants in this scenario – especially on Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate Income Tax (R202 billion) for example? The point missed by literature advocating for assumed contribution of foreign nationals in the South African economy is that illegal foreign nationals – who are the larger portion of this economic band, does not pay Personal Income Tax (PIT). Where illegal immigrants are within salaried economic band, they are employed in less paying jobs which are not remitted by tax authorities. Other immigrants work for the non-tax -compliant bands such as domestic services for example.

In addition, because the majority of these foreign nationals are illegal immigrants, it also means that the businesses they operate are in the main unregistered and therefore illegal, and therefore excluded with regard collection of Corporate Income Tax (CIT). In South Africa, it is easier to identify that there is increasing business in the informal business sector through foreign nationals of illegal goods and foods in the market. There are plenty of fake food products such as potato chips, sweets, soaps and soft drinks manufactured in unlicensed home-based and unaccountable factories. These contraband businesses operate tax-free competing with legal products sold by locals. Because the fake products are cheaper to the customer, foreign nationals have a better market base than locals – and their informal businesses are therefore sustainable. The assertions made here might be what Minister Lindiwe Zulu was referring to as mentioned in Skinner and Crush (2015), however as a minister might not have been able to articulate her position as blatantly as this paper might be because of government diplomatic protocol for example. Conceding that factors might materially differ from place to place, but the assertion made by Skinner and Crush (2015) that there was nothing unique on foreign nationals businesses remain contestable. The objective to present the scenario at Makhado town for example, is not meant to counter the views expressed by Skinner and Crush (2015) but to contend that what Skinner and Crush (2015) presented as indicated earlier does not remove the fact that some business operations between foreign nationals and locals expressed uniqueness. Incidences of uniqueness are expressed by amongst others illegality-legality factors of the businesses while on the one hand, issues of criminality in business tilt and skew the scales of operational profits and sustainability of business towards others, and not others for example. In the Makhado town, the survey of informal businesses undertaken revealed some form of business under-hand tactics going on in most businesses run by foreign nationals. For example, illegal contraband cigarettes were being cheaply sold in most hair saloons. Residents have witnessed day-light gun battles between police and criminal syndicates from across the border with Zimbabwe wanting to smuggle into South Africa illegal contraband cigarettes. These are not allegations of criminality in the informal business sub-sector involving foreign nationals but reality. These illegal cigarettes provide a cheaper market which competes the locals' market. Men from Zimbabwe approach locals in public spaces to buy illegal diamonds in broad day light, and still there are people who want to deny reality that criminality has set in amongst foreign nationals – and to a certain extent becoming the cause of prejudice against foreign nationals. The diamond and cigarette smuggler cross-border groups are organised criminal syndicates sustained by hardcore criminality of corrupt members of the South African police services and customs officials at various borders.

With regard to Value Added Tax (VAT), bear in mind that cross-border immigrants claim back the bigger chunk of the tax from the South African Receiver of Revenue (SARS) offices at the border when they leave the country. In a way, the immigrant population remaining in the country bought petty household consumables with a very little Value Added Tax (VAT) base. Effectively, the larger part of immigrants become consumers waiting to be fed by the economy, not to assist or grow the economy as claimed by activists and philanthropic commentators on Xenophobia in South Africa. The fact that foreign nationals translate into a government social benefit cluster increases spending on the side of government. It is a fact that South Africa has limited resources, not unlimited which the state has to collect from the tax paying public. Considering that the larger part of the public spending budget in South Africa is contributed by tax paying citizens and residents, this loosely translated, the South African public has to be paying for lifetime, social responsibility necessities of the none paying tax foreign national cluster. According to contenders such as Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010), Hicks (1999) and Skinner and Crush (2015), this is justice even if it comes with unfair burden on the tax payer in South Africa while removing the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” (O'Donnell, 2014) from the state of the respective immigrant.

This factor raised by the cited literature brings the immigrant population into the government social welfare programmes placing the immigrants in a collusion cause with both the citizenry and government. It is obvious that this is an unsustainable burden to the host country and its tax paying citizenry. From this, emanates contending thoughts by commentators of Xenophobia and exclusion politics of the pro-lifetime socio-economic support of South Africa to foreign nationals which, without looking at the broader picture of the complexities faced by the state opine that the South African government has moral responsibility in terms of international law “to balance the needs of the immigrants and those of the citizens” (Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010). On the one hand, the failure of the state to positively comply and strike balance between the needs of the foreign nationals and the impoverished locals paints South Africa a Xenophobic society – especially where government opines for an exclusive benefit system for citizens, and the ordinary citizenry argued for the termination of state generosity to foreign nationals (Berton, 2013). Contenders argue this point forgetting that South Africa, like any other country in the world does not have unlimited resources.

Facts on the ground, and to the contrary, point to the truth of the matter as that the majority of foreign nationals who were in South Africa for example representing the bottom half of the economy irrespective of wherever the foreign nationals come from. These are people with no formal skills or meaningful qualifications. For example, the majority of Zimbabwean nationals work in the commercial farms providing cheap labour to white farmers (Mafukata, 2012) while some are absorbed as domestic workers, security guards and taxi drivers amongst others. In support of this assertion, a study conducted in the Nzhelele area of Vhembe District, Limpopo Province, Mafukata (2015a) reported that the majority of Zimbabwean nationals, unlike other foreign nationals of Ghanaian, Ethiopian and Somali origin were never involved in informal entrepreneurship such as retail and grocery shop entrepreneurship which could employ South Africans. On the one hand, the Mafukata (2015a) study instead furthermore revealed that fewer foreign nationals running informal enterprises employed locals because they would rather work with their own nationals. This is in fact consistent with the assertions posited by Lim (2012) who reported that Chinese in Zambia were known to rather employ their own nationals than locals much to the dislike of the Chinese by the Zambians. Suppose the foreign nationals create employment and hire South Africans in their enterprises, the scenario would be that such workers would not be registered workers with privileges bestowed upon them by appropriate labour statutes in the country. First, the majority of foreign nationals run informal, non-registered, non-labour and non-tax complaint entities because most of them were illegally in the country without proper documentations. In fact, Skinner and crush (2015) concede that the majority of such enterprises generated little profits of approximately R5000 or less in a particular month. Given the household needs of foreign nationals, it makes no sense to think that an enterprise generating so little profit could be a source of income for another person – this time the South African.

However, on the one hand, those foreign nationals who are better skilled are instead employed in private companies and other government parastatals including institutions of higher learning. For example, of late, because of the shortage of Mathematics and Science teachers, some schools had resorted to hiring Zimbabwean teachers to curb the challenge. This however points to a small segment of the immigrant population because not everyone crossing the border from Zimbabwe is a Mathematics and Science teacher. It is therefore a contestable assumption where some literature claim that foreign nationals transfer skills into South Africa which South Africa lacks because of the issues of the country's apartheid history – and an inferior, and less productive education system. The fact that there are foreign nationals contributing to the job market in South Africa – in some limited sectoral systems is not only a unique issue of foreign nationals in South Africa. First, immigration is about seeking for improved economic benefits such as employment opportunities – especially where it is encouraged by unfavourable economic factors donating the labour. South Africans also do the same in other countries where they emigrate to. Secondly, skilled immigrants make the job market more competitive because of the options potential employers acquire from labour supply. The benefits of skilled labour supply for any job market will not therefore be particularised to the South African economy because it is a universal phenomenon across the world. Clearly, while foreign nationals are an important element of the South African job economy, however, it appears the contribution of foreigner labour supply in the job market in South Africa is simply exaggerated and overly stated. It is a universal belief that foreign nationals grow economies. It is not like what foreign nationals could do for the South African economy would be unique. Every economy around the world would never have enough skill and expertise, and therefore would always source the same from interested and available sources globally. This includes larger economies such as the United States and some parts of Europe. A country would not depend on immigrant labour and skill supply from illegality but must have a clear vision and strategy on how to attract foreign needed human capital to its economy.

2.6. The Role of Xenophobia Literature in Finding the Cause and Solution for Xenophobia in South Africa

Literature claiming to have had amicable solution to issues of xenophobia base their assertions on one or intertwined sets of the theories espoused by Crush and Ramachandran (2014); denialism, minimalism and realism. These theories have been widely deliberated on by Mafukata (2015b). A plethora of commentators of Xenophobia on South Africa negatively portray all those who deny that Xenophobia was the power behind attacks on foreign nationals as denialists, Xenophobic and anti-Africans. According to commentators who believe in this theory, the South African government and most of its politicians were denialists of Xenophobia all because these people hold a different view and also argue to the contrary. The denialism theory is built on the events of former president of the Republic Mr Thabo Mbeki. President Mbeki was known as a denialist of the Zimbabwean political crisis through his insistence of a solution in Zimbabwe through “quite diplomacy”. President Mbeki was internationally labelled an HIV/AIDS denialist. The literature postulating the denialism theory of Xenophobia in South Africa equates this trend with the events of the Mbeki denialism era hoping to portray South Africa in the international world as a historical serial denialist of its social challenges. However, this assertion gains international momentum whereas those labelled denialists on the one hand never deny that there were elements of Xenophobia in South Africa, but only argue that there has been that tendency amongst the commentators to Xenophobicise every unpalatable word spoken against a foreign national and in addition violence and attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa including

the use of words such as “makwerekwere” and opportunistic social challenges such as criminality (Charman and Piper, 2012; Mafukata, 2015b). The so-called denialists of Xenophobia in South Africa are only arguing that instead, some of the so-called Xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals were pure acts of criminality – especially by those anti-social elements within the South African public. Furthermore, the so-called “denialists of Xenophobia” are furthermore labeled Marxist-orientated thinkers motivated by support of the political economy perspective in the interpretation of the attacks and violence on foreign nationals who want to escape the reality of Xenophobic tendencies in South Africa by blaming instead neo-liberal economic policies and structural adjustment targets (Hickel, 2014) adopted by the post-apartheid government of the African National Congress (ANC) as the main cause of the attacks and violence on foreign nationals. In other words, “denialists of Xenophobia” represent what Rukema & Khan (2013) postulated as “scape-goating hypothesis” Simply put, the postulation is that South African politicians and bureaucrats, in their response to attacks and violence on foreign nationals are finding a scape goat in some other factors of this unabated social turmoil instead of conceding that the main cause of the violence is Xenophobia against other Africans. On the one hand, those who opine otherwise that the violence and attacks on foreign nationals were sponsored by societal inequalities created and promoted by apartheid which lead society scramble for scarce resources and materialism, and therefore seeing competition by foreign nationals as disadvantageous to their course are instead called minimalists.

Literature pushing for Xenophobicisation of attacks of foreign nationals purely shun looking at the properties of the so-called realism theory. According to Mafukata (2015b), realism and realists on the one hand seek to explain issues of Xenophobic tendencies in society as being an issue of social deep-rootedness of pervasive hostility and animosity of society against fellow humans – which however might be influenced amongst others by national identity, myths such as beliefs on witchcraft (Hickel, 2014), other societal stereotypical behaviour and the violent nature of society. These identity politics seem to recreate social boundaries (Hickel, 2014) between those perceived as “others” - meaning foreign nationals and those who perceive themselves bona fide South Africans (Mafukata, 2015a; Mafukata, 2015b). However, in these perceptions, commentators on social issues – especially those on human relations and interactions should bear in mind that social spaces are never blank spaces ready to be occupied by whosoever in society (Ramohai, 2014). Social spaces are to be earned after fierce contestations which in some cases involve violent intimidations of the “others” by the bona fides (Mafukata, 2015b). It is human behaviour to want to defend social space – especially when it appears the space is under siege and threatened by the “others”. In substantiating this view, Igwe (2014) revealed that human beings – especially where they shared common socio-economic motives, have always sought to protect the socio-economic space against perceived intrusion or violations of that space through collective actions. This defence and protection of the socio-economic space could take the form of Afro-phobia, apartheid, ethnicity, racism, tribalism, Xenophobia, and so forth. All these are forms of emotional, physical and psychological assault and violence on others – especially against those perceived as “alien”, “different”, “other”, “the stranger”. “outsider”, “non-member”, (Thomas, 2013). As confirmed by Whitaker (2005), generally – especially in African context, there have been ultra tendencies and behaviours across the world to exclude those perceived as “others” as indicated in this assertion by Harcourt (2009) “There is globally a prevailing mistrust along with naked exclusions and outright neglect and open attacks on peoples who are perceived as outsiders or a threat to the mainstream”

In this context, the literature postulating the South African crisis on attacks and violence on foreign nationals as a purely South African social trait – of the Blacks towards other Africans only for that matter, are missing implacable point around Xenophobia – especially on the point of it being a universal human trait which persists to undermine issues of globalisation and free human movement across the world as opined by international law of migration. In addition, Xenophobia and other related human traits are curtailing to fast tracking development but quick to fan genocidal catastrophes negating development (Harcourt, 2009). In fact, most of Africa's underdevelopment characterisation has been largely due to the inability of Africa to overcome petty but deep rooted traits such as ethnicity, tribalism and Xenophobia amongst others. Need this paper revisit and remind readers on the shocking results and impact of Xenophobic tendencies in the Great Lakes Region of Africa where millions of people were butchered to death in Burundi and Rwanda – especially with regard social cohesion, economic development and social transformation for instance?

While contestations for social space would continue to be part of, and remain very much part of human behaviour, it is imperative to conscientise society on the reality that immigrants are to be understood and considered legitimate participants in the socio-economic space of global economies. Fierce contestations based on racial, tribal, religious and ethnic manifestations have been issues of human concern for decades around the world – including in the so-called most advanced and civilized countries such as Italy, France, Russia, the United States of America, United Kingdom and so forth. In fact Harcourt (2009) conceded that in most European countries, Xenophobia, racism and religious intolerance have eroded the socio-economic respect and statuses of those peoples perceived as “other” despite voluminous proclamations of democratisation, modernisation and exaggerated civilisation of the citizenry by stakeholders to uproot these factors in society. Romero-Ortuno (2004) furthermore reported on Xenophobic tendencies in big economies such as the United States of America as having had been entrenched even in the elite echelons of public service in government. This exclusive strategy promoting curtailment or denial of social security rights against perceived “others” is propagated by draconian legislations and policy directives at the level of government to, for example, deny illegal immigrants – be they either refugees or asylum seekers for example any access to basic human rights issues such as health care as long as such service is publicly funded. Chauvinistically, this “civilised” Xenophobia is in addition to denial of service to immigrants, intended to complement utter Xenophobic tendencies such as deterrence of immigrants through ramped up border enforcement, build electrified border fences, arrests, detentions, incarcerations and deportations amongst others (Filindra, 2012).

According to Filindra (2012), the proponents of this gross violation of human rights contend that the actions are not Xenophobic but pure acts of good governance wanting to solicit and encourage illegal immigrants to “give up and deport themselves” because the views of these proponents are that “undocumented immigrants are very rational people. You have to convince people who come on

their own to leave on their own. They come here to get access to jobs...if you remove those incentives, they will respond rationally and leave” These “restrictive ideas” are an open assault of foreign nationals therefore propagating violence and torture of persons who have the right to be treated with respect in terms of international law of immigration. The idea here is to keep the foreign national away as far as possible contradicting the fact that global immigration has in a way grown to become an “inescapable dimension of a globalising economy” (Thomas, 2013). South Africa's detention and repatriation systems have received global condemnations as being Xenophobic – especially against other Africans because of issues of corruption by government officers and the horrible conditions that the awaiting deportees have to endure at the holding centres such as Lindela for example.

2.7. The Empirical Position of This Paper on Xenophobia in South Africa

This paper argues for the contextualisation of Xenophobic behaviour and tendencies in South Africa in the context of the rest of the world – not in isolation. This paper borrows its theoretical postulations from the words of Charman and Piper (2012) which encourage locationing of arguments on the issues of Xenophobia in South Africa in the wider context of what is actually happening in society. The contestation is that isolating the South African Xenophobic issues from the context of global challenges on Xenophobia absolutises, particularises and classifies Xenophobic tendencies to South Africa while white-washing the rest of the world. It is like South Africa needs specialised attention on issues of Xenophobia. No, the rest of the world needs critical attention to address Xenophobia, just the same way as it needed the world to have a global approach on racism; meeting in New York for example in September 2001 for a conference on the strategies to tackle global racism (Harcourt, 2009). However, the point this paper makes is not to postulate nor suggest that in South Africa, like the rest of the world, there is absolute “openness and tolerance prevailing” (Harcourt, 2009) on issues of Xenophobia. Undeniably, South Africa like the rest of the world where there are increased movements of people through immigration in particular, has indeed experienced countable incidences of Xenophobia as early as the events of May 2008 onwards. However, the extent of the same is grossly being exaggerated – for various reasons. In support of this assertion, Mafukata (2015a) in fact contended that there were places in South Africa where Xenophobia tendencies were so insignificant with only approximately 3.7 percent of South Africans admitting to harbouring Xenophobia against foreign nationals – furthermore citing that 40.7 and 33.3 percent of South Africans in fact had good or fair relations with foreign nationals respectively.

It is a fact that some views on the South African Xenophobic tendencies are based on political competition and mischief. First, South Africa's positive image on the international standing is a concern for many a competitor. Secondly, there is unwarranted expectation of “others” for South Africa to solve whatever socio-economic problems faced by the peoples of this region there is – but this must happen on the terms and conditions of those seeking assistance from the country. Thirdly, South African leaders – especially those in politics comment contrary to what foreigners want are demonised and labeled “Xenophobic”, “undemocratic” and “un-African”. Fourthly, everyone who run to South Africa for whatever reasons must be speedily allocated whatever they would want; permanent citizenship, asylum, refugee status, and so forth. Fifthly, South Africans must not “worry” of the increasing number of foreign nationals crossing the borders from elsewhere into the country but should instead open their borders “for a free for all” These are illusions held by many a commentators, and it is our honest view that trends on Xenophobic attacks, violence and attacks and criminality on foreign nationals in South Africa would not be reversed through “formulaic solutions” and frivolous processes and debates. There is need for radical analysis of the issues in order to design workable and practical solutions to that effect.

3. Methodology

3.1. Study Design

This study is qualitative based on a multi-methodology approach. It is a case study design complementing literature review to substantiate certain positions of argumentation.

3.2. The Study area

The main focus for case studies is the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province, South Africa. This paper purposively targeted the so-called “hot spots” for attacks and violence against foreign nationals in the Vhembe District. Makhado, Musina, Tshikota township and Thohoyandou are currently “hot spots” for these attacks, and therefore much of the field work data were collected from there. Since the objective was to obtain current events on “Xenophobia”, the approach was to foster a cooperation with the police and journalists within these areas so as to obtain alerts of any attacks on foreign nationals.

3.3. Data Collection Methods; Instruments and Data analysis

Firstly, this study reviewed existing literature on attacks and violence directed to foreign nationals in South Africa – and elsewhere in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Secondly, Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted with purposively selected participants who have been identified as crucial for this paper. A senior police officer in the division of crime prevention in the Makhado policing area was interviewed to obtain data. Secondly, a newspaper journalist was also interviewed. Thirdly, field work was employed to obtain data – especially at the “hot spots” Fourthly, some members of the public were randomly selected through snow ball techniques to obtain views on the subject of attacks and violence on foreign nationals in their local areas. Some interviews were audio recorded for transcription and material comparison purposes as the study progressed while other data were recorded as field notes. Collected data were analysed and recorded in the main report. Some of the responses given are indicated verbatim under sub-themes elsewhere in the main report.

4. Case Studies

The case studies are the results of the field work and visits undertaken to the selected areas in Vhembe District, Limpopo Province, South Africa. Two cases (Makhado and Musina) were presented in detail while only summaries of main issues were presented for Thohoyandou. This is because some issues were repeating themselves in some areas.

4.1. Makhado

In some villages under the administration of this municipality and town, there are incidences of Zimbabwean nationals who operate in organised criminal activities with traditional leaders (misanda) to obtain South African citizenships by bribing these chiefs (misandas). First these Zimbabweans buy themselves into the local village of the particular chief (musanda) to be a resident, and from there collude with the village leadership to fraudulently obtain South African documents. Some of these Zimbabweans are able to access government social services such as Social Grants for children, old age and/or disability. This, according to the respondents trigger resentments against known Zimbabwean nationals who access government service ahead of the citizens. On criminality and attacks of locals in the Makhado town, one respondent put it this way:

“Deep at night asleep, I am woken up by my wife's screams next to me. A man had opened our bedroom door and tiptoed into the bedroom. I woke up and chased after him. The man dashed out of my house through a broken kitchen door and ran into the night. A day after the following day, police bring a man to our house for identification because this man was caught stealing at a house some streets away from us, and the police had linked this suspect with our case the other night. Indeed, my wife and I managed to identify him. He was a Zimbabwean national. My friend, for that young man, breaking into my house is being too disrespectful, but to enter my bedroom where I am sleeping with my wife(Long Pause).... is unforgivable in my culture”

“I hear noise of a falling something from the lounge of my house while sleeping around 2am on a windy, drizzling and cold night. I decided to go check. Two men jumped over my sofas through my open kitchen back door. One holding something from my house. I run after them into the street. I hear one of these men shout at the companion “Ngatitize ari ku uya!” These guys were Shona speaking Zimbabweans who had broken into my house. They had stolen one of my music system speakers. A mere speaker”

“One Sunday afternoon returning from church with my family, there is a young man standing by my kitchen door holding a crowbar. He does not run away because it was now impossible to do so. I question him of what he was doing at my house with nobody in, he tells me he wanted a job. He wanted a job with a crowbar in his hand? Further probing, the young man was a Zimbabwean national from Masvingo who could not speak any of South African languages. He had just arrived from Zimbabwe, but passing to a place called Pretoria to seek for a job. You are going to Pretoria, then what do you want in my house with a crowbar, really? I conclude, the only possible things is that this young man wanted to break into my house”

“Just after 19:00 towards winter, my wife went out of the house to collect the clothes she had been drying out in the sun during the day just behind the house. She notices a movement of somebody squatting to hide behind the bushes just near our fence. She pretends she did not notice that. She comes back into the house and alerted me. I instruct my son to move out quickly, meanwhile I ran into my neighbour's house to seek assistance. We cordoned off the bushy area on the one side of my property. There were now so many people who had moved out now to assist. Some were carrying cricket bats, sticks, stones, garden forks and spades. We all started to look for this probable thief. We found a man hiding in the bushes, and the people started beating him up. The man could not speak any English. Someone who suspected this man to be Zimbabwean national spoke to him in Shona, that is when he apologised for wanting to steal our clothes. The police came and took the man away who was now injured and bleeding from the mob beatings. In the morning when I was filling up my vehicle at the nearby Petrol station, here is that man sitting by the corner at the station. The police had released him”

“Some three years ago while in Uganda, I received a call from home. My wife tells me that my entire fence had been run down by a speeding car. The man abandoned the car and ran away on foot. On investigation after the police had been called to the crime scene, they identified the owner of the vehicle as an Indian business man who stayed few streets away from my house. When they contacted him, he was not home but visiting in Pretoria (380Km away), but had left his gardener at home. This gardener had stolen one of the master's car for reasons known only to himself. The other workers identified the driver as one Zimbabwean man who had worked for this business man for many years. He had taken the car without permission and caused the damage at my house, and ran away. The police looked for him every where and never found him to date. I ended up repairing my fence at a very high cost”

This respondent exclaimed “What do you want me to think of Zimbabweans?” He then said, “let me tell you what I think...I wish our government could just load the Zimbabweans in one big lorry and send them back to Zimbabwe all of them because you never know one who is not a criminal. They all use same name...if they are not Goodenough, Goodmore, Tawanda or Tendai, then they are coming from Harare or Masvingo. How can you have everybody in a country coming from one place, using similar names?”

In order to prevent criminality, some residents formed night patrolling groups. They take turns to patrol the neighbourhood. However, others – especially the affluent, have private security in their properties. Two weeks ago when writing this report, five gun shots were heard in the neighbourhood, and an Indian business man who was visiting the targeted businessman escaped with only a bullet in the door of his vehicle. The suspects were seen during the day on surveillance in the area, and they are known foreign nationals in the area. Some respondents also cited challenges in the town as increased prostitution – especially during the day in some selected areas of the town. Respondents indicated that the majority of the young girls on prostitution were from Zimbabwe. They hire cheap rooms for accommodation in the town – especially from those landlords who have property in town but do not stay in the town. These girls take their clients to these rooms while others would use the nearby bushes for sexual service. The risk of spreading diseases such as HIV/AIDS remain high. Police fail to address these practices for various reasons. On field work, the researcher and the assistants could identify the “hot spots” for prostitution. However, it became difficult to verify if indeed the lingering girls were Zimbabweans.

4.2. Musina

Musina town and its surrounding townships are the first entry point from Beitbridge border post from Zimbabwe and elsewhere northern Africa into South Africa. Musina is an old copper mining town which had significant number of foreign nationals from the north of South Africa. The town has been dominated by multi-culturality for many years for since during apartheid era, there have been hundreds of foreign nationals working in the copper mines in Musina. A large number of these foreigners were naturalised into South Africans, and they have stayed in this town as bona fide South Africans for decades. However, most of these naturalised foreign nationals have always kept family relations with people of their own from across the borders of South Africa; Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia in particular. As a result, there continues to be relatives of these people who are still living in their native countries visiting them in this part of South Africa from time to time. Through relatives and other forms of descent to people living in Musina, some of the foreign nationals were able to obtain fraudulent South African documents and in addition, citizenship. Some, through legal means such as cross-nationality marriages also obtain South African citizenship. Although it might be difficult to obtain South African Visa because of South Africa's hostile state complexities, South Africa still grants citizenship to foreign nationals who have roots through descent in the country (Muzvidziwa, 2012). In relation to South Africa's difficult Visa and entry requirements and conditions, foreign nationals aspiring for a better life collude with corrupt state agencies to obtain documentations illegally and fraudulently.

The majority of the respondents revealed that Musina town and its townships are the most uncontrollable space in terms of foreign nationality influx into South Africa. In fact, some respondents mentioned that the town had more Zimbabweans than South Africans, and the most spoken language in the area are Shona and Ndebele more than any other local South African languages in this Zimbabwe-South Africa border town. There were more maxi metered taxis carrying people from the town to the Beitbridge Border post than there were those carrying South Africans into the Musina townships. The majority of the customers in the busy retail industry in the town are Zimbabweans than locals. Some of the Zimbabweans cross the border on daily basis for shopping while others cross to visit their relatives, pastimes, seek for employment, do informal business in the town while others cross to seek services such as medical attention in the local clinic and hospitals. Every persons within the Republic has a right to access health service. However, how does Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010) explain a situation where citizens of another country cross borders to seek for medical help in another country? Some respondents in Musina revealed that there were Zimbabweans who crossed the border to come for medical assistance in South Africa. Obviously, when locals run short of medicines as is usually the case in Musina health dispensing centres, they are bound to raise concerns over the increasing number of Zimbabwean patients – who have just crossed the border for treatments at the health facilities not that they were in South Africa when the ailment took place causing the shortages. The shortages explain the fact that South Africa has limited resources not lack of will or commitment of the South African government to assist patient border crossers. The issue of the South African public raising dislike of foreign nationals based on access of public resources such as health access, housing and education emanates from this kind of practices which place disadvantage on locals, not necessarily empty fear of the South African public on foreign nationals which translates into Xenophobia. This makes it impossible for the state “to balance the needs of the immigrants and those of the citizens” (Hanekom and Webster, 2009-2010). In the view expressed by Hanekom and Webster (2009-2010), South Africans are Xenophobic for protesting against being placed at a disadvantage or refusing to provide the service to this patient border crossers, and in addition, such failure to positively comply demonstrates “the failure to supply basic rights to masses of impoverished South Africans” which eventually “adds an additional obstacles to South Africa's ability to ensure basic rights to non-nationals” Hanekom and Webster postulate this view forgetting that South Africa, like any other country in the world does not have unlimited resources. Every sovereign state has an obligation to take care of its own citizens and all those who reside or find themselves within the particular state at a particular point in time. Obviously, in this context, it is the responsibility of the Zimbabwean government for example to dispense public health service to their citizens and not other states to do the same.

In Musina, respondents revealed that housebreakings and other thefts characterise the town and it becomes difficult to arrest the perpetrators because they cross back immediately into Zimbabwe. Some interviewed South African taxi drivers revealed that there are Zimbabwean nationals who are operating illegal taxi business within the town without proper permits. Already this practice is a potential trigger of tensions in the taxi industry which has been known to be characterised by serious violence which has resulted in uncountable deaths for years when operators fight for routes.

4.3. Tshikota Township

Some respondents revealed that the township was a haven of illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe. A large number of these Zimbabwean nationals do informal work as motor mechanics, electronics – TV and Radio repairs, building and construction, although there are many others who did not have any employment. On field work, what was amazing was the high number of vehicles in the streets of the township with Zimbabwean registration numbers. There was a significant population of Zimbabwean nationals staying in an old derelict building in the township which used to be a hostel for migrant locals. Respondents indicated that the building was once destroyed by fire during some violent protests and attacks on Zimbabwean nationals in the township in 2014 who were staying in the building due to the notorious crimes they were committing from the building. Respondents also opined it was also not safe to walk at night because of increased criminality and incidences of murders perpetrated by Zimbabwean nationals in the township. Residents would know the identity of the perpetrators when such perpetrators went to court in case of arrests. Most critically was that the foreign nationals staying in the township steal goods in the town and bring them for hiding in the township where these thieves stayed. Bicycles, electronics such as Plasma Flat Screen TV and refrigerators, food and clothes were mostly targeted for theft. Some of these items were resold in the townships or stored for smuggling into Zimbabwe intermittently – especially during the festive seasons in

December when these foreign nationals went home. Another crucial thing mentioned was that the RDP houses provided by government have been taken over by Zimbabwean nationals through rentals or fraudulent transactions. Some of these houses have been turned into informal business sites by mostly Somalians, Ethiopians and Ghanaians in particular.

4.4. Thohoyandou

Thohoyandou is one of the fastest growing towns in the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province. The town has one of the greatest retail industry in the district, coupled with massive chain stores and super markets and government service offices. There is also a university with a population of approximately 12 000 persons, and hardly four Kilometres away there is a tertiary college offering Further Education and Training (FET) education to a population of approximately six thousand students. The town has a magnificent five star hotel providing gambling facilities. There are so many Indian, Chinese, Ethiopian, Ghanaian, Nigerian and Somali grocery, hair salons, hardware shops entrepreneurs in the town. This is a generally peaceful town. However, of late beginning 2014 and early 2015, there has been some growing attacks and violence against foreign nationals in the town. Observations are that the majority of these attacks and violence targeted mostly Zimbabwean nationals. The respondents revealed that it was because Zimbabwean nationals were seen as criminals by locals. Each time there was a crime in the town, from petty theft, robbery or even murder, mostly, it is a Zimbabwean involved.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper investigated the objectivity of literature on Xenophobia and prejudice against foreign nationals in South Africa. The majority of literature on Xenophobia and prejudice against foreign nationals in South Africa theorised that foreign nationals were innocent victims of paranoid South Africans and their government which undermined issues of international law of immigration and migration. This paper argued that foreign nationals fermented some attacks, violence and Xenophobic prejudices because of criminality and unfair business practices which give them profit advantage and sustainability prospects over locals. In order to simplify the understanding of issues of Xenophobia in South Africa, this paper presented its argument based on three theoretical assumptions; that foreign nationals were in contrast to some existing research fermenting Xenophobia from criminality. Secondly, the paper argued that it was the responsibility of the state to prioritise other socio-economic issues which the country faced post-liberation, and not immigration. Thirdly, the paper argued that in contestation of Socio-economic/geographical Space, locals employ techniques such as violence and Xenophobia against foreign nationals. This insinuation explains why “hosts” contend with “other peoples” On this, this paper drew its contestations from the observations made by Ramohai (2014) who posited thus “Social spaces are not blank and open for anybody to occupy. Over time, through processes of historical sedimentation, certain types of bodies are designated as being the ‘natural’ occupants of specific spaces...Some bodies have the right to belong in certain locations, while others are marked out as trespassers, who are, in accordance with how both spaces and bodies are imagined politically, historically, and conceptually circumscribed as being ‘out of place’. Not being the somatic norm, they are space invaders” This excerpt illustrates an important issue of social exclusion or the marginalisation of people within a social space in which some are considered legitimate members or citizens, while others are considered less legitimate and do not have an equal footing in the daily activities of the community. This excerpt scrutinises the concepts of sharing and citizenship, which should underlie any successful endeavour regarding access to government services to its citizenry. With regard Xenophobia and prejudices against foreign nationals in South Africa, this paper made the following observations:

- There were certain sections of the South African public which could be labeled Xenophobic and in addition in practice of prejudicial tendencies against foreign nationals. However, this is a small minority. Despite this observation, foreign nationals are in most cases receiving fair amount of support from locals – especially the fact that they were able to freely do business with the locals whether they were illegal immigrants or not. This support is demonstrated by the continuous rentals of property belonging to locals by foreign nationals to run informal businesses such as grocery stores and hair salons for example. If locals were absolute Xenophobic and prejudicial as intensively as some commentators argued in their literature, such rentals would not have been possible. Despite some isolated cases of prejudices against foreign nationals, pointers are that foreign nationals had socio-economic freedom to be part of communities, and should therefore be afforded that space to fully integrate with the rest of the local society because they are a critical and legitimate participants of the South African socio-economic space who in terms of law should have equal opportunities with the locals in the socio-economic rhetoric of the country.
- There are a plethora of causes of Xenophobia and in addition practices of prejudicial tendencies against foreign nationals. The majority of literature reviewed refutes postulations that foreign nationals also contributed to causing tensions and Xenophobic attacks and violence against their group in South Africa. This paper however found to the contrary. Through documented case studies based on intensive interviews, observations through field work and Key Informant Interviews (KII) of various stakeholders, this paper established that the main cause of Xenophobic and prejudices against foreign nationals in the majority of communities in the Vhembe District, Limpopo Province, South Africa are instead resulting from criminality committed by foreign nationals on locals. For example, house breaking and theft, robberies and murders dominated attacks and violence meted out to locals by foreign nationals – especially during the night. In addition, this paper established that there were some criminality involved in some of the informal businesses belonging to foreign nationals which give foreign nationals advantage over locals in terms of profit making, attraction of the market and sustainability of business. From these criminality in business, what the locals perceive as unfair advantage spark tensions and unwarranted competition between foreign and local traders with foreign nationals targeted for attacks and violence. Furthermore, the South African public feels

threatened by continuous acts of criminality committed by foreign nationals – considering the fact that some of these foreign nationals are illegal immigrants with no form of identity. In case of crimes, it is difficult if not impossible to trace them.

- Arrests, detentions, deportations and repatriations characterised draconian strategies by the law enforcement agencies such as the police to control and manage illegal entry of foreign nationals into the country. These strategies are costly and not productive for the government. In fact, some respondents – especially in Musina and Makhado towns revealed that those foreign nationals deported into Zimbabwe by the South African Police return the same day they had been deported. Those immigrants who would want to reach places such as Johannesburg and Pretoria for example, even walked openly in the roads so that they could be picked up by the police who would keep them in police stations therefore providing shelter and food. Arrests and detentions become exhausting to the police – especially with factors such as increased corruption at the borders by officers who receive bribes from immigrants to let them in. Effectively, these practices become empty routine.
- The number of unaccounted for foreign nationals is increasing substantially all over the country – from rural villages to towns and cities. The study area also has increasing number of foreign nationals. Some of these foreign nationals work in criminal syndicates with community leaders and Home Affairs officials to obtain South African documentations so that they could qualify for state social welfare services. After obtaining the relevant documentations, it means that these foreign nationals could also have their relatives also becoming South African citizens. These practices happen in broad day light, and they increase competition between foreign nationals and locals for state resources. Resentments emerge when those known to be foreign nationals benefit ahead of the locals.

As a matter of policy recommendation, this paper borrows its premise from the assertion submitted by Kamwimbi et al. (2010) who posited thus, “the government must eliminate the climate of impunity that makes foreign nationals appear to be unequal before the law. And it must work harder to promote sustainable opportunities for integration” and that “the Rainbow Nation belongs to all who live in it”. By so doing, stereotypes about foreign nationals would be soothed and ameliorated therefore promoting “networks of social cooperation” (Bratton et al. (2005) to the advancement of the country. However, primarily, there has to be an educational campaign by stakeholders to conscientise the foreign nationals of the dangers of engaging in any kind of criminality because from these crimes emanate the Xenophobic sentiments characterising society today.

6. References

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