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Consciousness for the Institution of Resilient Social Organization: A Formulation of Political Will Perspective

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Abstract:

Competent social organization remains the most critical basis/basics of threshold for political economy dynamism. No political society is blank out of creativity and creative will to innovate and renovate its future. But this comes with a political condition that such society engages in reflective knowledge and action upon the making of a competent political choice. The basic assumption underlining the paper is, a political economy that is competently creative and recreative will undoubtedly build a resilient institutional capability that demonstrate strong will and commitment to the nature of civilization it practically desires to build. Thus, political will exist at all times and places with two-sided character - dialectical and dualistic; hence there is nothing like lack of political will which demonstrably pass as an ideology of governance incompetence and state failure which could be misleading. The thesis is: there is political will for corruption and political will for anticorruption and political will to build strong institutions and political will to build weak institutions depending on the available political wisdom and interest. On this premise, the trouble with building institutions does not rest with natural resource curse and institutional curse but with human curse, hence inertia or creativity is not inexorable as what is critical is the human will. In the final analysis, it is pragmatic, spirited, patriotic, and competent men as consequence of constructive political will that builds strong institutions for resilient social organization, afterall, men are in significance the basis and basics of all self-discipline.

Keywords: *Political will, social organization, human resource curse, political economy, uncertainty avoidance*

1. Introductory Review

The concept of social organization is used frequently in engaged intellectual conversations of how a broad, preeminent, and disciplined practice could be courageously initiated, reflected upon, interrogated, adopted, and adapted to solving societal problems and or challenges. The dominant goals of every dependable social organization is the extent at which a community of people is able to independently and conscientiously nurture the risk-taking social consciousness, the knowledge, technique, discipline, and power over the environment (Rodney, 1972). Meanwhile, social organization has been made evident and demonstrated as basic to and at the heart of bringing to bear freedom of judgment and the confidence to proceed toward workable development of any given state. Researchers, while bearing in mind and reemphasizing the fluidity of organizational intent, content, context, culture and challenges, they were apparently not honest enough to place responsibility for the character of social organization on the state seeking progress through freedom irrespective of the role of history, et cetera.

To be exact, while history is a factor in the level of social organization, the development that occurs with such social organization may still be in spite of history because we assume that human character is disciplined to respond to dynamics of the contrasting time. Although, history impinges on the present, but the present even without the help of history is not blank out of creativity and creative will to contend with prevailing challenges and create its own history. So shouldn't it be that societies' "significant responsibility is the praxis of reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it"? (Freire, 2002:561). Or was it not Habermas (1971) who

challenged us that “development of productive forces facilitates the emancipation of society from nature and domination by others, but this is not enough; it needs the cultivation of both productive and reflective knowledge”? And Cabral (1966) sums it up that competent social organization is created and transformed by detailed knowledge, by effort, and sacrifices.

Up to a point, the social organization approach from the leadership/followership perspective seeks to explain why some countries’ social organization’s responsibility are more practically and competently envisioned and determined in building resilient institutional capabilities than others. That is, institutions that serves a fundamentally strategic, approximately dynamic, crisis management driven, and workable future needs of society than others are what our approach think through. In what could be the reason for the different experiences, scholars have provided seemingly plausible explanations for effective social organization. While some identified cultural orientations (Hofstede, 2002), others pointed at ethical leadership (Northouse, 2013). Differently, some stressed on core competency management (Aguinis, 2013), value for human content and productive forces approach (Ake, 1996), and institutional approach (DiMaggio & Powell, 1993). In the same breath, others pointed at resource abundance (Sachs & Warner, 2001) while some insisted scarcity as the driving impetus for capable social organization (Krautharmer, 2005); not forgetting the dynamic capabilities approach (Teece, Pisano & Schuen, 1997) and knowledge production and management approach (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). There is also the familiar dependency (Nabudere, 1978) and modernization (Rostow, 1960) schools of thought, and the productive and reflective knowledge of Freire (2002) and Habermas (1971). Below is a graphic illustration of how the few theories reviewed in the paper are by our conceptualization tie in to political will.

1.1. Diagram I: Derivative Elements of Political Will



Figure 1: Derivative Elements of Political Will providing illustration of how the focus of other theories reviewed in the article is determined by the Uniqueness of Political Will

The illustration explains the role of Political Will in the development of Dualistic Character of Social Organization, a character that incorporates the substance of other models. We derived our model from the inevitable certainty that all societies like all individuals are endowed with a given consciousness or determinations, in the same manner that all societies like individuals are characterized by administration or management.

In specifics, the construction of social organization as it concerns the role of the state has been given consideration in due measure by these approaches. Comparably, the state of mind of a given people has been represented as an underlying responsibility that guarantees competent or incompetent social organization. Thus, we are of the assumption that the productive management of states through profound effort in competent state management cannot be removed from the consciousness and determination of the natural and learned ability of human character. Our social organization opinion may further underline as a point of reference in the state building project and process when we take seriously the natural make up and the demonstrable visionary effort made by human mind and character. In this research effort, our review of the preceding approaches has shown that natural resource abundance, natural resource scarcity, institutions, competencies, dynamic capability, leadership, human content, productive forces, reflective knowledge,

knowledge management, cultural character, etc. were treated as if they have consciousness and determination of their own, independent of human character and will.

In this paper we therefore seek to comprehend and underscore the role of institutions not only as structures but as the immanent organic systems and processes, and the plausible coherence that are internal to, and which underlies social organization. Accordingly, we are of the assumption that the primary focus of the preceding approaches is not workable without effortless systems, processes, and rules. For instance, every state is known for a given level of capabilities and competencies whether weak or strong, and the predisposition to regenerate these capabilities and competencies (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) is not an issue for market forces to determine but the responsibility of human character. Sure enough, norms and laws are significant to every form of social organization; however, the institutionalists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1993) failed to acknowledge the activating factor that underlies different institutions as it is with various forms of social organizations. Our argument is that, while all societies value progressive social order through disciplined systems as forms of capable social organization, they must also take seriously what values that the norms practically add to that society. In this sense, the significance of value addition and value subtraction are neither neutral to human will nor exercised outside it.

For instance, the political economy of systems in our own view presupposes subjectivity, interest, struggle, conformity, and aberration, which brings to mind the role of political will and choice. This view was discounted by positivist researchers which has it that scientism is the answer to establishing effective social organization as against social constructionism (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012). Questioning this view, Ake (1979) explained that science itself is not disinterested let alone the scientist because science and the scientist have values; hence both are subjective in the choice they make and the goal they seek to achieve. It is this will and choice and the will in choice making as we argue that in the final analysis determine the state of affairs of social organization, a perception which formed the major argument of this paper. This leads us to yet another reflective observation that, since all organizations are actually political, including their evolution, in other words, engaged in one form of administration and management, there is a will that is immanent in them, to construct a social organization that is desirable and feasible or not (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013).

We started the article by critically providing some exploratory insight into few approaches as they touched on social organization of states. In what follows are the operationalization and critique of political will and or 'lack' of it and the development of the paradigm of political will. Next is the deconstruction of the resource and institutional curse theses towards a human curse thesis. Further, we examined social organization and institutional capabilities towards an integrative framework for a disciplined political will with few specific illustrations. Lastly, we put forward a concluding statement on the limitations of, and directions for future research.

2. Political Will: A Conceptualization

The thought of social organization could be as old as man in the restless pursuit of survival instinct and development of security and civilization, so too is political will. The historical materialists (Onimode, 1985; Rodney, 1972) would have it that human and material development is necessary for competent social organization. This perspective has been dominant in a number of revolutionary political economy researches which have molded certain compelling convictions in some intellectual researches and publications (Bangura & Stavenhagen, 2005; Olukoshi, 1993). However, except for researchers of the profound persuasions within the disciplines of Social Sciences, the concept of social organization has been adopted and treated unadventurously, and without sounding too serious, contemptuously. There is even a penchant to dissociate the nature and character of development from a form and content of social organization in some literature (Leonie, 2000) without knowing that the constitutive elements of the character of human mind and effort at social organization determine the development of society. This is why we take up that the cognitive form of institution is superior to normative and regulative forms of institution in terms of resilient social organization.

Following this average perception of social organization even within the sociological discipline (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008), this article review some of the perspectives of the unquestioning researchers whose works have not been impressive to deepen diagnostic scholarship, to say the least. Thus, this section will begin by showing the areas of convergence and divergence between the not-so-committed researchers and the apparently committed ones with respect to social organization and the role given to political will. In this context, the philosophical value of political will framework has apparently not been conceptualized towards a more competent understanding of social organization. This failure to operationalize the concept of political will from both dialectical and dualistic perspectives could explain the mishandling of the concept of social organization. To be sure, the nature and character of political will could lead to either latent or manifest functions or a celebration of appearance against substance or not.

Consequently, we are also of the persuasion that the concept of political will has a two-sided function which invariably cannot deny the existence and employment of political will in every management and leadership responsibilities. In all political actions including the corporate world, there is the demonstration of political will as an index of social discipline or a demonstration of its opposite in relation to what it seeks to achieve or not. On this premise, intellectually and or administratively, we are of the critical insight that, there is no such context like lack of political will. Our political will framework call attention to, again, our assertion that it is even politically mistaken and inappropriate to explain or rationalize political condition, in other words, governance or management practice and condition, by making allusion to lack of political will as alibi. Essentially, such effort to explain governance reality says nothing, and if anything, a denial of or the failure to confront reality as it is and give it a fitting narrative. What researchers have achieved in doing in our review is what we called the mystification of both the process and the outcome (Allison & Owada, 1999). In any case, the common practice is that nobody wants to be identified with a process that produced an outcome that is questionable much as everyone desires to be part of a success story without knowing that such effort in itself is an expression of political will. To further escape from this questionable reality, the common practice is to give it the curious phrase, 'lack of political will', without also appreciating that in

both process and outcome there is political will either as an incentive or disincentive. The rational actor model (Woocher, 2000) conceived of political will to consist as follows:

1. The actors' goals;
2. The actors' perceptions of the objective situation; and
3. The actors' judgment of the cost and benefits.

Our review of this model is simply that these three variables do not determine political will; rather, it is political will that bears them out in terms of what the goals are. Our take is that, it is the social conscience, determination, value or motivation and not the actor's goal, perception, and judgment of cost and benefit that are the determinant of political will, except for the role of perception. This is because the three safe for perception cannot even explain the nature of political will except if the perception is gleaned from the perspective of collective will for public good. Woocher's perception of political will was also shared by Carment and Schnabel (2004) when they define political will as the actors' commitment to take on actions for the purpose of achieving certain goals including keeping up with the cost and benefits of the actions overtime. Our assumption is that commitment itself is political will, whereas political will is not reducible to suitable policy instruments and the readiness to implement policies, because we consider them as political actions, whereas political actions are determined by political will. Again, political will goes beyond cost-benefit analysis even though it is an elementary part of it, but essentially, it is about building a competent social organization irrespective of the cost or the cost of the benefit or the benefit of the cost. This is why we explain political will as the determining force of political actions and the motive force of history. It is thus interesting that Brinkehoff (2000) included inaction in his conceptualization of political will, a position which corresponds with our own operationalization afterwards.

It is enduring therefore to think through our proposition which follows, that in every governance environment and condition there is the existence of political will. Thus, social organizations that develop and tolerate inclusive political and inclusive economic institutions or those that build and endure extractive political and extractive economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) are mere expressions of political will. We also postulate that in every political will in relation to political action, inaction or both, there is the inherent presence of contemplation, calculation, choice, collaboration, culture, cultivation, consumption, conspiracy, competence, commitment, contradictions, corruption, crisis, consensus, confidence, consciousness, conformity, character, conscience, and change. All of these are constitutive forms of dialogue or exchange, collectively or individually, combination or mixture of these determinant variables for or against effective social organization. If this postulation of ours is approved and established, we may proceed, yet again, to articulate that these twenty (20cs) are expressions of political will in their contradictory forms, though not exhaustible, from the dualistic and dialectical perspectives. When we do this, it becomes evident that in every political will there are contradictory values straddling between extremes, which in the final analysis lead to political choice and political practice until when there is another political will to review earlier political choice either to conform to it, improve upon it or defy it. Below is a diagram illustrating the conscience character & function of Political Will which are inexorable in every forms of social organization.

2.1. Diagram 2: The 20Cs Explaining the Two-Sided Political Character and Function at All Times




Figure 2: An Illustration of the 20cs existing at all times in every Political Action, explaining the two-sided character and function of Political Will either as a social discipline or indiscipline

Thus, as demonstrated in the article, Political Will functions in converse forms; hence, it is ineffective to speak of lack of Political Will. For instance, it takes Political Will to entrench corruption as a culture; however, it also takes Political Will to fight off corruption. Just like Conscience has two sides to it, so too is Political Will. For this, the illustration explains what we call the Political Will Conscience.

To illustrate, a given political will that demonstrates absence of force of character for good governance can if it desires, still have the strength of character needed for good and accountable governance. In Africa south of the Sahara for instance, lack of political will is fast becoming an ideology of governance incompetence and institutional failure without making serious effort to tackle this failure and the probable cause of this failure. Incidentally, tackling this failure also require political will to make the failure history or to

perpetuate the failure either ways. It has also become a convenient, careless, dismissive, and indolent manner of characterizing governments or ruling elites' poor performance. Probably when you meet the man on (in) the street he will tell that challenge of weak infrastructural development is because of lack of political will. But, lack of political will is not an unquestionable tired expression, even in practice, and to think otherwise is to portray an inadequate and misleading reality. What African leaders/rulers and intellectuals have done in the name of lack of political will which they use as the *raison d'être* for crisis of governance and development in Africa is to treat political will as if it is detached from the human will or agency and the consensus emerging from the will caused by those in government or influenced by those outside the pathway of power and in most cases encouraged by the people. This presupposes that political will does resides in both the leaders/led or rulers/ruled in collaboration with or in contradiction against the preservation of existing or formulation of new policy.

Accordingly, what literature on leadership and development ended up doing is to treat political will as if it is one abstract mechanism that cannot be held accountable. Essentially, what they failed to realize is that, political will is in principle and practice a compelling value and not an insignificance that cannot be tackled. That is why in all circumstance, we tried to propose that there is always the political will to do what is right or wrong, just or unjust, moral or immoral, legal or illegal, appropriate or inappropriate, suited or ill-suited, commitment or indifference to law than justice, and to be active or inactive. Consequently, and by this, we do not always tell the complete story of our practices in public service for instance, when we deny the existence of political will or that a government lacks political will, say, to exemplify good governance. Our point of view is that it adds up to living a lie, and probably a conspiracy to misrepresent reality. This intellectual dishonesty has contributed to the poor literatures on the role of political will and its interrogation in development, for instance, in Africa. This kind of epistemology which characterizes political will as unbiased that is external to leaders and managers of the state but impinges on performance in office makes it difficult to apprehend lack of political will. This apparent positivist interpretation of political will or 'lack' of it does not help in promoting democratic/accountable governance, an interpretation that gives the illusion of science as if science itself is not a social activity with subjective goal?

For instance, as one huge crisis of governance and development in Africa, corruption in all ramifications is nothing else than an expression of political will, *ceteris paribus*, certainly lack of political will cannot make public corruption a serious development crisis, rather it is political will for corruption that does. A second feature of our conceptualization is that, the political will to be corrupt or not to be corrupt or to even become corruptible or incorruptible are wills emerging from individual conscience/discipline. That is, political will, either ways, is a social innovation used to create the world that we desire either for or against the greater population of the people. The mention of the people is deliberate because in a democracy it is said that government is of them, by them, and for them (the people). Third, what makes democracy an impossible assumption or an impracticable form of government could be determined by the role given to political will. It may be observable at this point that political will do not exist independent of reality but in relation to, for, or against. But if it does, then it may not make any significant sense. Again, if our proposition is valid that the reality of political will is internal to all forms of social organizations and leaderships, then political will as often expressed by leaders and scholars as a social reality yet inevitable which enables us to provide practical explanation toward increasing a broad understanding of the political economy of lack of political will.

Following this, we also argue by using Africa, that, it is not that African leaders/rulers south of Sahara for instance, lack political will for development, but that they subjectively espoused, expressed, reflected and embodied in this continuum a political will alien to and against self-reliance for capable development which they even promised and vowed to bring about during independence speech, military coups speech, political campaigns, and swearing-in-ceremonies. Political will can also manifest in form of impunity, tenacity to make flawed laws with loopholes by Legislature, mediocre legislative oversight function, brazen executive lawlessness and stealing from public treasury. The offer of justice for sale to the highest bidder/dealer by elements in the judiciary, and negation of rule of law/justice by corruption aided and abetted professional associations are not political actions that happen by chance nor is corruption that goes with them a political choice that is fortuitous. Our argument is that political will does not operate from the point of accident nor is it an inadvertent endeavour as the positivist would make us to accept, the reason why we premised the research on the values of social constructionism (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). Within this conviction, it remains not to be convinced of course that political will has its own logic and contradictions, principles and values, disposition and predisposition, and success and failure.

On balance, we think that the logic and contradictions embedded in Political Will brings out clearly, for instance, the character and conscience of leadership in power, their vision, and political choices in terms of decision making and implementation. It suffices to provide one illustration using Nigeria to explain different political will by different leadership on a particular development, namely, the petrochemical refineries in Nigeria. Arguments were whether the four refineries should be privatized as a result of the neglect of the turnaround maintenance of the refineries which contributed to collapse of the refineries and the subsequent years of importation of refined oil. Another ensuing argument was that the turnaround maintenance should be carried out so as to refine for domestic consumption rather while licenses are granted to private investors. If public perceptions of Nigerians were anything to go by, Nigeria should not only have the four refineries functioning at high capacity rate, but that the exploration and refining technology should also be done and controlled by Nigerians.

However, this is not the case with Singapore for instance, without oil yet with three refineries that serve as the petroleum refining epicenter of Asia. Objective evidence indicates that while Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) sold the four Petrochemical Refineries as scraps to seemingly unwilling private investors, this decision was reversed by the Yar'Adua Administration (2007-2010), and began the turnaround maintenance, albeit at a slow space. The successor Jonathan Administration (2010-2015) continued with the maintenance of the refineries, rather in a manner liken to dragging of heels which probably explained the preference for importation to refining domestically irrespective of the huge wastage of public funds paid as rents to importers of petroleum product. However, few months after the Buhari Administration took off, there was an unquestionable resilient determination which exuded confidence for

domestic refining. This renewed commitment to fast track the turnaround maintenance of the four Petrochemical Refineries now in full swing of operational activities, though at different levels of capacity utilization with challenges of vandalization of oil pipelines, tells a lot about a different political will.

Following this illustration from Nigeria, it is obvious that the four Nigerian leaders demonstrated different political will at different times but on a single variable, the Oil Refineries. It is against this background that we treat lack of political will as a misnomer. Judging from this 'misnomer' called lack of political will, our argument which is premised on the values of accountability is that, lack of political will in strict empirical significance cannot in every respect be measurable and verifiable because it expresses a denial of variables that are not amenable for quantification and measurement. A political variable is measurable and verifiable not by its absence or scarcity like lack of political will which denies its existence yet powerful, but by its demonstrable character and impact. That is why by our conceptualization political will is not inactive but always in a movement, in motion, and compulsive nor is it ever in scarcity or short supply.

These characterization and categorization of political will could provide variables under which these political wills are empirically definable, measurable and verifiable from the Social Science research. Based on this, we can differentiate between two political wills as two realities; in other words, there are two dynamic political wills in any form of social organization as identified in the preceding. This characterization will enable us to know the political will that is predominantly in practice and why, and of course, how it is functional to effective social organization or not.

3. Brief Deconstruction of the Resource and Institutional Curse approaches: Where is the Human Resource Curse?

Following the preceding arguments, we have decided in our review to categorize these explanations into two plausibilities, namely, the human-mind effort perspective and the natural resource abundance and natural scarcity perspectives. For want of clarification, we incorporated the dynamic capability, knowledge creation and management, human content, leadership, cultural dimension, and institutional approaches into the human-mind effort perspective because of our persuasion that they are both human resource driven and determined. This is not to mean that the natural resource/scarcity perspectives are not human resource driven and determined. However, the natural resource abundance and natural resource scarcity that exists differently in all measures, for instance, the case of Nigeria and DR Congo and Japan and Singapore respectively were not known to be determined by human effort, as history has not demonstrated that. This characterization became even more necessary because of the need to give the resource curse approach the needed benefit of doubt owing to their broad effort to providing explanations of the cause of incompetent social organization in some developing countries. In the course of our deeper reflections and interrogation, we will appropriately review them and see which is most discernible and amenable first to our hypothetical assumptions, and then to the reality and trajectory of competent social organization, including the research goal we seek to achieve.

Earlier researchers, including intellectuals on development have pointed out two common but opposite maxims of necessity are the mother of invention and abundance is the mother of inertia. But we added the third which is, creativity is the father of necessity. These two maxims bring out two seemingly consequent independent variables, namely, scarcity and abundance respectively and how communities of people or states were able to manage them each taken into cognizance their challenges, choices and needs. However, the third principle which we added is with political required to competently manage scarcity and abundance. A careful review indicates that necessity, invention, abundance, and inertia (NIAI) are other four familiarly adaptable and intellectual variables in these maxims but taken for granted by researchers on development while formulating their assumptions. Subsequently, our deep bias for risk taking leadership with the possibility of daring uncertainties in the most pragmatic approach with long term and inclusive vision as inevitable form of reality enables us to appreciate the role of scarcity and abundance in the making of competent social organization.

Following this, we desire to clarify that necessity which expresses compelling need is not necessarily the cause of invention because it could also be the mother of paralysis or inertia given different conditions, namely, differential ambition and vision. Therefore, scarcity and the desire and commitment to self-reliance could also be the mother of invention; hence our thought that scarcity or abundance with value for self-reliance could be the mother of creativity/invention, except if self-reliance is taken as necessity which is not in all societies. In these dialectical and dualistic realities, necessity could proceed from creativity to abundance or necessity proceeding through inertia leading to scarcity. These two likely experiences explain the differential sources of capabilities for social organization in various countries, experiences that are defined by the differentials of Political Will. Below, is figure 3 illustrating this perspective.

3.1. Diagram 3: Differential Sources of Capabilities for Social Organization




Figure 3: above illustrates the paradox that characterizes the differences in the making of social organization in resource abundant countries and resource scarce countries

The diagram illustrates that necessity is inescapable in all societies because it underlines the compelling and permanent feature that must be appreciated and contended with. However, owing to the dialectical character of political will available to all leaderships and States depending on the vision for self-reliance, the variability of creativity and inertia is not in doubt in both countries. Consequently, either of scarcity or abundance could paradoxically characterize any countries notwithstanding whether the countries are rich or poor in natural resources. This as the diagram illustrates is because of the differential political will for the various cultural (national and intellectual) character of leadership in terms of uncertainty avoidance, indulgence, pragmatism, and time vision orientations.

The persuasion of this article is that each of scarcity and abundance in the making of social organization present themselves as Responsibilities, Opportunities, Risk, and Challenges (RORC) requiring Consciousness, Wisdom, Learning, and Confidence (CWLC) either in combination or individually. To this, we say that there are compelling conditions in all societies, either in the society of scarcity or the society of abundance since no condition is self-contained and fixed at every threshold of development ad infinitum which confronts and are confronting, a condition that makes the dynamic capability approach relevant. Thus, we argue that Inertia is neither inevitable/unique to the society of abundance nor is invention inexorable to the society of scarcity or of necessity since by our observable assumption abundance and scarcity are experienced in all societies. At the heart of our contention is the intellectual persuasion that what is done to abundance and scarcity is not internal to the two variables but external to them, in other words, human-effort driven in creating the required knowledge.

Basically, the variables of scarcity and abundance do not have will/consciousness of their own except the one given to it by external agent, namely, the human will which, again abounds in all societies in the timeless process of building values and institutions. A close observation of the trajectories of development of nations indicates that societies of resource abundance have differently and separately experienced invention and inertia, same as societies of resource scarcity have likewise lived through invention and inertia separately and differently. For the purpose of this analysis we propose the Human Curse Thesis as against the existing Resource Curse Thesis and the Institutional Curse Thesis. In practical terms, these are all too familiar when we research into the various continents and countries of the world providing us contradictory explanations and realities of scarcity and abundance in many literatures too numerous with illustrations, (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003; Stiglitz, 2005; Gelb & Grassmann, 2008, Collier, 2007) for instance, the resource curse thesis.

However, we should also point out that, these literatures also acknowledged the unique exceptions of countries without really reviewing the cause-effect relationship in their theory building and the practical justification for them. Owing to this, what emerged in the process are the many mishandlings of the cause and effect relations. For instance, in providing explanations on resource-abundance society (RAS), these scholars have consensus on the following:

- i. That natural resource revenue corrupt government officials;
- ii. That volatility in natural resource market leads to negative economic growth;
- iii. Crowding out of human and social capital, in other words, the shifting abroad of talents and innovation; and
- iv. Rentier consciousness and dependency conditions.

Taking these four assumptions together, we discovered that what we considered as effect is largely used as cause to explain the nature of social organization for development in relation to natural resources. In our review of literature, it became clear that they apparently failed to provide clear explanations for the disposition and predisposition for inertia; rather they indulged in a misleading manner in the very effects that they used as cause.

The responsibility of intellectuals as we envisioned is to establish what the most perceptible causes are, like knowledge creation and management, leadership character, cultural orientations, the Senge's Five Disciplines (Senge, 2004) of "shared vision, mental models, system thinking, personal mastery, team learning" and value for human content. At least, if anything, they should have availed us of what is responsible for this predisposition which they also did not. Theories are seemingly weak when their assumptions fail to establish strong relationships between cause and effect and worse when the initial cause is treated as effect or symptoms treated as diseases. In retreating from these predispositions, the scholars suggested that the building/presence of strong institution is the remedy. If this is the case, why did the scholars fail to argue that it is the absence of strong institutions, albeit done deliberately, that could explain the inertia of resource-abundant society (RAS)? Why didn't they also acknowledge that resource-scarce society (RSS) could also develop with the presence of strong institutions, even though they failed to tell us how the strong institution would come about? This Intellectual sophistry of employing the Cart to drive the Horse explains the major reason for this paper.

In our further review, we asked that if failure to provide answer to a challenge is later established, is it not logical to identify the unknown solution which is now known, as the cause? Following this, it is significant to acknowledge that institution and institutional capabilities are critical to building competent and resilient social organization. This is because institution defined in three ways, namely, by its thought process, its capacity to create standards which are necessary, and the power to ensure order, in other words, cognitive, normative, and regulative forms of institutions (Scott, 2001) respectively are fundamental to effective social organization.

But let us even interrogate the cognitive institutions, relate it with Natural Resource Curse thesis, and then examine what the Resource Abundant Society (RAS) like Nigeria have done. Thus, Ake (1981:9) developed the view that notwithstanding the 'prodigality of nature', man like nations must labour by inventing and reinventing her material existence and by implication his consciousness in order to make nature appropriate to his needs and make his social existence profound. The significance of doing this as articulated by Ake (1981) is that it "develops capabilities and creates opportunities" for further development in the future, an experience that would require an interrogation of what man and nations have done to the three fundamentals of the labour process, namely,

- a. Labour power: Physical, Psychological, and Intellectual Capabilities of Man
- b. The objects of labour: Coal, Cobalt, Crude Oil, Gold, Diamond, Iron Ore, etc.
- c. The means of labour: Tools, Technology, Electricity, Access Road, Vehicles, etc.

Taken together, the three constitute in political economy what is called the productive forces which in turn determine the productive capabilities of every society. Thus, the question is, is it b that determines a & c; a determines b & c; or c determines a & b? In all prospects, aside which determines which or not, the natural order of inevitability and significance is a, c, b. So, what have the resource abundant developing country like Nigeria done compared to what they have not done to a, b, & c? What has Nigeria harnessed for herself compared to what has harnessed Nigeria against her? Our take is that effective social organization taken from our leadership and crisis management perspectives is determined by a, and then c. in relation to b. Following this, the question future research should provide answer to is this: is Africa an intellectual continent dedicated to the transformation of intellectual capabilities towards being a problem-solver in the 21st century?

This foregoing, our conceptualization of social organization presupposes that the task of building strong or weak institutions is based on the vision for learning and knowledge creation and crisis management philosophy. These two concerns acknowledge that vulnerabilities, opportunities, risk-taking, and crisis (VORC) are internal and perpetual to every forms of social organization. However, the philosophy of crisis management in institution building is the attitude of proactive value-based leadership in a political climate and culture of compelling and robust authority, order and control. This again informs the contention that the manner in which crisis is perceived, defined, valued and acted upon (PDVA), and what constitute crisis, and when and how the crisis is communicated and to who, and made as part of associated tool for state building project, will in the final analysis explain the nature and character of

national culture for development. Therefore, the effectiveness or otherwise of social organization of any society is a mirror illustration of the varying degrees of the political will commitment to development and underdevelopment, including faithfulness or not to the values of dependence or independence or even self-reliance (Rodney, 1972).

Explicitly and equitably, competent social organization of the state like the struggle for the production of technological knowledge, competence and innovations is not an arbitrary or unsystematic project, rather a political choice that is not amenable to debate. Technology as it has manifested itself doesn't just emerge, but a painstaking consequence with cumulative character in time and space which helps in effective social organization. However, technology is an endeavour into the future requiring bold investment in education, "basic research, research and development, product design and quality assurance tool" (Easterby-Smith & Prieto, 2008:245). This explains the role of core competency of human resources, innovativeness and dynamism towards constantly approximating the ideal state of development that is timely and appropriately realizable. Again, purposeful and operational education that values the human content and challenges the intellect by way of interrogating them while taking cognitive form of institution serious is another competent form of social organization.

Fundamentally, the task of functional education is to unleash the boundless faculties to socially engage and contend with the challenges of institution building and institutional capabilities. In other words, the former is dependent on the latter, and not to have vision for a practically functional education is to be consequently contemptuous of the building of technological infrastructure as a form of purposeful social organization. In a manner of speaking, it is a social organization of education that level-headedly engaged in resourcing the community of available natural, exceptional, and skillful faculties and resources (Fanon, 1963). A community resourcing for effective social organization is a collective and integrative cultural framework of value and necessity in the social construction of development. To take social organization seriously is to demonstrate in pragmatic conditions the Knowledge, Power, Discipline, and Technique (KTDP) required coming to grips with the environment and making it explorative and utilizable.

Pilbeam and Corbridge (2010) took with commitment the diagnostic role of knowledge production through functional education committed to crisis management research in form of people resourcing and talent planning and management. In a manner of speaking, it is the degree at which human resources are acknowledged and practically treated as the most functional and dynamic driving force of political and economic organization as demonstrated in Ake's Human Content Approach under political conditions of strong authority, control, and self-restraint (ACR) which makes countries to be functionally dynamic in their capabilities. This again explains the limitation in part, of the dynamic capabilities approach of Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) and Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997) because they didn't concede to the political will role as a driving force for dynamic capabilities. But to be fair to them, dynamic capabilities scholars were essentially in private organization on how they can renew their resources.

Up to an argument, the essential underlying idea is that, the two approaches have recognized the significant merit and limitations of each other. The intellectual researches gaining depth in Social Organization Framework of broad leadership which we take seriously have appreciated the evident fact that institution is not an arbitrary systems and processes of bringing phenomenal reality into being. In other words, the logic, contradictions, and dynamics of every given or prevailing reality in the task of social organization are neither natural nor neutral. However, it is concerned with how the nature, character, and goals of institution capabilities develop overtime. This realization is dependent on the extent at which the human resources of the society seeking development may or may not constitute a factor of utter dependence or gratuitous underdevelopment or both. This argument is clearly taken further by Rice & Patrick (2008) when they highlighted the significance & otherwise of institutions vividly thus:

- a. Fundamental capacity and will to carry out and accomplish well-defined State responsibilities;
- b. Lack of demonstrable will to develop an environment of equitable and sustainable infrastructure;
- c. Ensuring legitimate, transparent and accountable institutions to foster public needs;
- d. Lack of commitment to established laws or rules and acceptable best standards as an indicator of poor governance in the public sector.

A review of these four highlighted clarifications of institutions revealed and confirms our earlier argument that institutions either as structures or rules or both are not independent values standing on their own or naturally created without values nor is anyone forbidden from creating values of its own choice. Afterall, all values are said to be created to serve the purpose given to it not by any organism internal to it but external to it and with a will.

Thus, the creation, development, preservation, reform, and rebuilding of institutions are practical demonstration of consciousness, desire and determination which we proposed as political will. Building on this deduction would require researchers to appreciate our standpoint that the building of strong or weak institutions is a matter of political choice made possible by the prevailing consensus among the elites and the extent at which the general population buy into this consensus or challenge. Henceforward, we propose that, though open to consideration in future research, the building of resilient or weak social organization is a function of leadership and followership since every society is known by what it accepts, rejects, tolerates, adopt and adapt to over a long period of time.

Although we agree with Collier (2007) on the need to build rules, build strong institutions competent for rules implementation, and building a critical majority of citizens that understands the institutions and are ready to defend them for purposes of answerability, responsibility, strength of institutions, social order, predictability, quality of service delivery, and generally good governance. However, Collier (2007) didn't tell us who build these rules, institutions, ensures rule implementation, and make citizens that will defend these institutions that are internal to the values, choice and needs of a people – in a word - identity. Our opinion is that those who build rules and institutions have a political will and must be strong with selflessness, steadfastness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership while the citizens called to defend these institutions who also have their own will must be disciplined, and except these two political wills expresses a common ground that overlaps, a competent social organization is most unlikely.

4. Social Organization and Dynamic Institutional Capabilities: Towards an Integrative Framework for a Disciplined Political Will

In our delineation of political will, it might be clear to a point in our argument that political will has not been seriously and intellectually conceptualized towards a common understanding of the challenges troubling competent social organization in search for dynamic institutional capabilities. If literature ever did, it rather smacks of passing commentaries which failed to work out the interactive role of political will in the making of social organization for dynamic institutional capabilities, a task for both the leadership and followership. Again, if we take our conceptualization of political will with significance, we might realize that the political will to begin the task of social organization for self-reliance in development could be more contradictory than complementary, more destructive than constructive, and more latent than manifest and vice versa in different countries depending on the road taken and the road not taken (Davidson, 2000) as a manifestation of political will. Thus, our integrative framework for political will examined the efforts at democracy and being democratic, the relationship between democratic practice and self-reliance, issues of cultural dimensions as it relates to leadership, and providing few practical illustrations on attempt at building social organization and efforts at dynamic institutional capabilities of very few selected countries.

In our preceding argument, we put forward that between social organization and institutional capabilities we may not know which should come first; however, if we take effectual social organization to be a constructive standard pattern of behaviour and effort of the human mind to establish a development process in a manner that such effort takes care of the future today by reducing vulnerabilities of the state against powerful social forces at home and hegemonic forces abroad, then institutional capabilities should follow social organization. If again we take social organization to mean a creative process of exhausting the possibilities, talents, knowledge, and competencies of the people on a recurring basis in a manner that gives them the self-reliant initiative and discipline, then the future of dynamic institutional capabilities is assured. Our premise is that, a leadership and followership whose social construction of political and economic realities are not pliable to the impulse of other social context is most likely to be dynamic in the underlying competencies of political and economic life, in other words, would have the self-confidence to be contemplative towards bringing about development that is reassuring and sustainable. If this analysis is appropriate, we may as well argue that effectual social organization and resilient institutional capabilities cannot be achieved in absentia in the same manner that the struggle through self-reliance cannot be passed on to others. Therefore, it is politically naïve and a demonstration of crisis of self-identity for leaders of all entities to attempt to shave their hair on their behalf, because it is an experience they must undergo each time the shaving is practically necessary.

As suggested earlier in this paper, the idea of experiencing self-reliance by attempting it seems to us in our reflective observations that the practice through self-reliance does not require democracy to be in place. We also put forward that democracy cannot be meaningful without the struggle on, with, and through self-reliance. But to all appearances, Ake (1995:86) holds a contrary position or so it appears. For him, "self-reliance is not possible unless the society is thoroughly democratic". If this is the case, we might as well seek a distinction between democracy and being democratic in order to establish whether we are saying the same thing or not. In all likelihoods, can democracy be practiced without being democratic and can a country be democratic without practicing democracy? The likely answer to this question can be found in the divergence between pragmatism and naiveté, between policy and implementation, between courage and cowardice, and between falsehood and truth. Whenever these divergences are experienced or made as national pastime, democracy is most likely to be transformed into representation without real participation, an experience that the practice of self-reliance internalizes and made feasible, but far from being a preoccupation because the political will could overtly exposed leaders as ruling elites rather than governing elites, an experience that contradict the struggle for the values of self-reliance and a democratic life.

There is a growing understanding in development literature that democracy is one form of social organization (Saliu, 2012); but its value cannot be more superior to the value of struggling on, for, and through self-reliance except democracy itself is practically democratic. Or how do we explain the reality that critical infrastructures for robust social organization and dynamic institutional capabilities are built by leaders with self-reliant struggling values for and through self-reliance? Again, we are also of the proposition that institutions in countries struggling through self-reliance are not known to be weak because of the political will to ensure this is present and reassuring. But it is significant to clarify the often repeated expression, for instance, like: weak institution is the bane of democracy and development in Africa. Our take is that, it is not so much that institutions are weak even in reality, but the compelling reality is that the political will to continuously make the institutions grow weaker is very active, resistant, restive, and riotous (ARRR). The political economy of deliberately-made weak institutions is that it concretely entrenches a political will that attends to the undemocratic decadence and self-absorption of the ruling power. This for us is what researchers should commit their minds to and to also investigate the political will of the people whether they line up behind leaders that exhibit the political will for anticorruption governance or express overt or covert support for political will that practice covetous governance or not. Thus, our proposition is: the character and goal of political will and not weak institutions determine the nuisance value of democracy and development in countries. For want of illustration, countries like Singapore under Lee Quan Yew was much concerned with struggling through self-reliance than an undisciplined type of democracy being practiced today by most if not all sub-Saharan African countries with fewer exceptions.

The democratic experience in Singapore under Lee Quan Yew by our conceptualization was a moderated or a disciplined type of democracy that was democratic. But one basic condition for this type of democracy is that the impassioned leadership is first and foremost a firm believer and practitioner of self-reliance and a maker of his civilization in the face of other ruthlessly competing civilizations (Yew, 2000), and this is more so to the natural resource scarcity. In other words, the leader through his confidence, conviction, resourcefulness, energy, commitment, knowledge, and sophisticated culture would always be on the field ready to build and entrench a civilization that is unique to the needs and aspiration of the nation. It was a moderated democratic discipline that did not elevate and celebrate bare incompetence over cultured competence and naiveté over performance. This again brings us to the

inescapable proposition that: the values necessary for robust and resilient social organization and institutional order which manages state building crisis are first of all internal to that society, a feat demonstrated by Lee Quan Yew by moving Singapore from a backwater country to a uniquely first world prominence.

Ensuing from the experiences of Singapore, we are tempted to illustrate how political will could employ cultural features in the construction of robust social organization for resilient institutional order. In this circumstance, we opted for Hofstede (2002) five cultural dimensions, namely, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, long/short term orientation, pragmatism/indulgence, and individualism/collectivism but without being fixated. But we must make it clear that we are only espousing the cultural dimensions in relation to and in explanation of, and understanding of political will. So, the dimensions are not used using universal application, hence we are not using state as unit of analysis but leadership of countries. Taking these cultural features of Hofstede seriously, we argued that African States/leaders for instance, have demonstrated their consciousness and choice of these features in their governance practices as a reflection of their political will most probably in a deliberately unconscious manner. These consciousness & choice of specific orientations determine the level of social organization and institutional capabilities internal to countries.

Following this narrative, let us briefly provide few illustrations on the state of African governance within the discourse. Most African leaders with very few exceptions like Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976), Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso: 1984-1987), Muammar Ghaddafi, (Libya: 1969-2011), etc. have apparently expressed so much political will for status, title, and prestige as against the weighty responsibility of the office. This demonstration of political will for the trappings of office is transformed into an end in itself with no reprieve for the means because it articulates political cupidity. In this circumstance, the likely faithfulness of the leader is so much constrained by what the prestige of the office could confer against the democratic responsibilities of the office for public good. In this political context, social inequality would not merit serious attention; in other words, he could practice democracy without being democratic thereby widening the gap between the prevailing social economic divides. Thus, it becomes a culture of "exercising power without responsibility and the masses were suffering (from) this power without redress" (Wilmot, 2006:31). This gap could get even wider when the extant political will in action expresses interest against the struggle for and through self-reliance.

The reality of social conditions today in Africa south of the Sahara, could point out to the existence of high or wide Power Distance expressing a political will that unfortunately came to be unique to it. But we must also note that experiences have shown that few leaders in Africa that practically exhibited faithfulness to a narrow or low Power Distance were either overthrown through a military coup, killed, or frustrated out of power, while others survived, like J.J. Rawlings of Ghana, yet others still by providence came back to power like Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria. These Low or Narrow Power Distance Leaders have actually demonstrated the political will to move their country from a corruptible and dependent society to an incorruptible civilization where the leadership discipline is to continuously make effort to ensure democratic economic inclusion, equity, fairness, and justice. Therefore, a high Power Distance Africa, with few exceptions, the poor is taxed more than the rich; petty corruption is fought more than high crimes against the State; the contest for power is ruthlessly absorbing; power is made equivalent to irresponsibility; disagreeing with superior is risky; sycophancy, cronyism, and rentierism are very thick; bureaucracy is made equivalent to inefficiency and wastage; the human content and discontent are made insignificant; election rigging a huge cultural pastime, and building infrastructure for development is an undertaking that exclusively deserves neglect.

However, there is a perceptible possibility of having High Power Distance leader or State that act differently from the above because of the nature of the Political Will and the Conscience and Character behind it, after all culture is context specific but dynamic. Good examples of High Distance society/leaders but distinct from the preceding illustration are China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, etc. These countries are also exemplification of low uncertainty avoidance which explains the abundance of Political Will to expect uncertainties, confront uncertainties, and deal with the challenges of socio-economic and political uncertainties at anytime and anywhere. In other words, their strides in the current state of development may not be farther from the leadership political will and the competence in crisis management, including the political wisdom of taking care of the future today while managing the crisis of yesterday.

In practical terms, the leaderships in these countries might have as a national culture made possible by national leadership orientation the reputation for risk taking, patriotic investment in functional and purposeful education, effort at self-reliance, and reducing the social imbalance in their countries. Hence the proposition waiting to be tested: leaders/countries with the reputation for low uncertainty avoidance and weak power distance have abundance of political will for self-reliance and internal development.

Is it not the case with countries like Nigeria, and the likes in West Africa that have over the decades demonstrated high power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance? The question is: why is uncertainty that is inevitable in all societies, abhorrence in most part with leaders in Africa, and if it is not, why is the state of crisis management in terms of good governance in the sub-region underdeveloped including infrastructure? Why is power distance very wide in West Africa and if it is not, what is the state of inequalities in Africa? Why is internal democracy and democratic inclusion such huge challenges in Africa, and if it is not, why the poor democratization of economic opportunities? For Ake (1996:9) while reviewing the practice of democracy in Africa he has this to say:

→ Somehow, we tend to think of democratization as an abstract process dissociated from a specific content...because in our self-reflexivity, we take the human content for granted, having unconsciously made ourselves and the likes of us the content...another way of describing the blindness to the sociology of democratization (1996:9).

The Proposition here is: African countries/leaders with wide power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance not known for risk taking and crisis management are likely not to pursue social justice and democratic inclusion.

This brings to mind the rational and persuasive argument raised by Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (1997), "what have we done to ourselves compared to what has been done to us by others"? In practical terms for instance, what West Africa as a sub-region has demonstrated over the decades is the political will for depravity by the leadership and the tolerance of this venality by the followership, though with

few exceptions. Politically in Africa South of the Sahara, it is not apparently familiar and convenient for leaders to enthusiastically risk the unusual; however, what they have done in the name of the people and in the label of development are to settle for the conventional and avoid the hard, rough, and indispensable road. The proposition here is that: the history of governance in Africa sub-region is the history of governance by indulgence. Future research should be able to test this proposition against the structural features of “disarticulation, narrow resource base, dependence, and the inertia of social relations of production” (Ake, 1981:135-38) of the sub-Saharan African economy. This is why there are trenchant calls and so many drumbeats for diversification of the African economy and what has Africa done in terms of diversification without taking the productive capabilities of Africa into studious context.

For purposes of robust social organization and institutional capabilities, we are of the thought that what African countries need is not so much about diversification of the economy, but building an economy that is not rootless and which takes diversification into basic sectors serious. Experiences are that diversification efforts in some selected Africa countries have been reduced to tokenism as a minimalist way of preserving the existing state of affairs. After all what is diversification if technological backwardness is a fundamental feature characterizing the African economy? What is even the value of diversification when effort through self-reliance is not a pragmatic need? At best, the broadening of economy should not be done in a manner that it ends up in creating more extractive and rentier sectors, to be exact, not to perpetuate the present enclave economy of unemployment.

Thus, diversification in Africa, if any, has not shown to be a transformation towards building self-reliant, inclusive, and enduring economic institutions for massive employment for growth and development, but to increase the size of rents, an experience that largely keeps us today where we were, for reasons that are already familiar, namely, the fear of risk and taking risk. But our thinking is that the real diversification that Africa needs now is to break off from the excessive fidelity to the kind of education that is a drag on the growth of productive forces to one that is feasible, pragmatic, and utilitarian.

First, for effective social transformation of every forms of social organization, our Political Will Framework requires that Africa should not indulge in eating the bread baked by others. But to delight in baking Africa’s bread, not minding the taste while eating it and getting others to taste and eat it even when Africa eats her own. This is the classic case of diversification that Africa needs. Africa should not make the mistake that the major reason for diversification is to increase foreign exchange, which would be a great mistake. What should be the motive is the pursuit through self-reliance that practically expresses the democratization of opportunities and inclusion in the political economy of Africa rather than persisting in the illusion of their destructive accumulation by deprivation (Harvey; 2005) of public wealth.

Thus the proposition: efforts at diversification without proportionate or more efforts at and through self-reliant education that nurtures behavioural and technical competence for inclusive growth and inclusive economy will most likely perpetuate collective indulgence and inertia. If near nothing, so what must have been preoccupying the minds of leaders and followers in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, what is their state of contemplation for public good? Does the reality of African condition today still speak of a political will of inertia in a 21st century time when the world economy is taking macroeconomic instructions from Asia? It is not surprising therefore that in the 21st century most African countries could still not boast of backward and forward linkages, and could not even begin to dare uncertainty in the pragmatic manner by building a West African Mega Iron and Steel Industry. Still not unusual that, while the USA could beg China not to devalue her currency (Yuan) after the 2008 world financial crisis that originated from the USA, sub-Saharan African countries are being given the macroeconomic ‘command and control’ to devalue their currencies. Except for fewer African countries/leaders that are risk takers and change agents, the tragedy of political leadership is the political will for, not national culture, but political culture of Uncertainty Avoidance.

The trajectory of self-reliance and transformation obliges that development in any form of social organization is a daring act required to deal and clear existing ambiguities/uncertainties before other uncertainties emerge to impose their will. Our take is that Transformation of Africa from its present state does not oblige us to entertain prevarications and fear. As a dynamic and daring enterprise, African rulers must become leaders with the responsibility to radiate confidence and knowledge in order to take risk for public good and become change agent. Thus, transformation of Africa is not a venture that is certain for takeaway, but an enterprise that obliges struggle through a self-reliant consciousness, calculation, collaboration, commitment, competency, consistency, and civilization. The proposition is: the self-indulgence of leaders in Africa encouraged by an average number of the population could explain the rentier consciousness and rentier reality of the African economy.

However, this evaluation will be unfair to Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi (1969-2011) in terms of the Political Will to make the Choice between the practices of liberal democracy that is in vogue today in most part of Africa and the struggle to be democratic through effort at struggling through self-reliance and the practice of economic justice and social equity. If anything to go by, the political leadership during this period was a risk taker that dared uncertainties including from outside the continent, established a narrow power distance by taking the human content seriously. There is no doubt that Libya during this time was a low power distance country/leadership in terms of the presence of human content in governance, the building of social infrastructure, narrowing down of social imbalance in the country, the attempt at equitable social relations, having the best in terms of human development index (HDI) for various years in Africa, lessening dependence, maintaining currency independence, and building technological infrastructure. In any case, this feat was achieved from oil revenue; hence it is not so much about Oil as a resource curse but the nature and character of the Political Will.

Following this, and from our Self-Reliance Framework, Libya did not practice the pretended liberal democracy of the West but was democratic a country in terms of the struggle for and through self-reliance against external dictation and domination. Based on this framework, we are of the following proposition: efforts at being democratic through struggle for and through self-reliance serve the cause of Justice than an ostensible liberal democracy that serves the cause of Law.

Following the preceding uncertainty avoidance, the two other cultural characters are the long/short term character and pragmatism/indulgence character. Our proposition which needed to be tested in future research is this: a predominantly driven uncertainty avoidance rentier Africa would encourage Short Term Thrust as against long term thrust and consequently engage in indulgence rather than inspiring pragmatism. The rentier character of Africa does not really allow for long term orientation as the political will for indulgence is strengthened against reason and commonsense.

The role of Indulgence is that it doesn't allow for critical contemplation and calculation for problem solving internal to a given social organization. To this, necessity doesn't inevitably lead to creativity and discovery but leads to inertia and this makes short term orientation and seeking immediate gain practically very attractive. The consequence of this is that the government, people, and society in general become impatient with the timeless nature of inventing new healthy civilization. This is because since they are not used to such discipline they could not bear going through the tortuous, protracted, and cumulative process of transformation and change without really knowing that the political economy of ad-hoc orientation gives false legitimacy to the leaders but protracted future crisis against the people.

In the final analysis, in the social construction of competent social organization it is evident that countries that thoroughly settled for, tolerated, and patient and familiarized with extractive political institutions and extractive economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) and without the extractive ruling elites honestly realizing that without building and ensuring democratic economic inclusions, governance might be dedicated to moving self-indulgence to the limit. But has our political will thesis explained the problem of social organization and institutional disorder that has become persistent feature of certain countries? Did the political will thesis address the gaps left by the resource curse, institutional curse, dependency, and the dynamic capability scholars?

Following our evaluations so far, we are convinced that these theses, in large part, have demonstrated some weaknesses which may not help in providing practical explanations of dynamic institutional capabilities for a competent social organization. Our adoption of Hofstede Cultural Dimensions within the context of our political will framework of which self-reliance framework is derived from tested against few countries, have apparently brought out the intellectual fallacy in some scholarships. Whether our political will thesis was able to take care of these logical errors, namely, reification and externalization of crisis of social organization or not, without thoroughly theorizing about the role of disciplined political will, is left for future research to grapple.

5. Conclusions, Limitations & Directions for Future Research

This paper contended with the idea and reality of social organization and the role of political will in establishing a competent one and an incompetent another. This was done by integrating the role of institutions and what determine robust institutions for effective and efficient social organization into two frameworks, namely, political will framework and self-reliant framework where the latter is determined by the former framework. The lack of explicit conceptualization of political will and failure for researchers to acknowledge its superlative value in bringing development about is depressing. However, we have reviewed literature on social organization from the leadership and crisis management perspective. Following this, we experienced how scholars were convinced of the effectiveness of resource curse and institutional theories in their theory formation to explaining the sub-Saharan Africa. In the process, the scholars ended up mishandling effect for cause and consequently could not provide problem-solving explanation of the state of social organization of sub-Saharan Africa which we merely used as illustrations.

Although these past research endeavours have set off in drawing on each other's scope from our framework of analysis and what we set out to achieve, except for few, they have been rather not holistic, though not unexpected. Most probably, this is so necessary for their own convenience and goal without essentially being responsive enough to the existing diversities of thoughts, contexts, culture, history, the subject scope of discourse and the misleading tendency to foreclose directions for future research. This again is understandable; else there wouldn't have been need for review of existing literature and the possibility to make up for gaps that are created perhaps deliberately or not why carrying out review. Needless to say, this paper makes effort to be subjectively objective knowing fully well that objective science in all honesty is demonstrably challenging to say the least, and in spite this consciousness, we made effort against the subjectivism experienced during the review of the discussed approaches. Despite this observation, the disposition to be hegemonic in intellectual discourse in the literature was in our own estimation a determined limitation.

However, we dare to point out that the approaches under review all have their merits in specifics no doubt; and the subject matter of their approaches form a significant part of social organization which as we argue is determined by political will as the starting point for understanding a given social organization. These limitations are apparently prevalent probably for three reasons. First, there are literatures that subscribe to hegemonic intellectual discourse where researchers impress their oversimplifications on others. This kind of research bigotry leads to conceptual inadequacy and forecloses of knowledge. Second, the failure to be aware of the research value that definitions are impressionistic and are not absolute in time and space, and that there are different frameworks of culture and experiences which limit the predisposition for hegemonic overgeneralization. Third, there is the failure to recognize the value of multidisciplinary approach in the process of conceptual development.

Following this, we provided a perspective of the discourse in the making of competent and resilient social organization. In this regard, the multidisciplinary approach was given the desired role towards a more significant conceptual model. We espoused the dynamic capabilities, resource curse, cultural dimensions, social organization, institutional, crisis management, and scarcity approaches. It is out of these that we proposed our Political Will Thesis to see how relevant it is to explaining political and economic conditions most prevalent especially in Africa and Africa south of the Sahara including developing countries for illustrative value. Thus, we made seven contributions in this paper:

First was a summarized review of relevant and related theories which helped to provide us the delineations and limitations of the theories in relation to explaining social organization.

Second, we conceptualized political will from the philosophy of dialectics and dualism which assisted us to develop a political will thesis around which other reviewed approaches relate to with the thought that it should form part of the future thinking and research.

Third, we further argue that there is substantively no phrase by the description 'lack of political will' and that what exist at all time and place but employed for different purposes to serve convinced course, is political will.

Fourth, we argue and took a position that rather than resource curse and institutional curse theses, what researchers should be concerned with is the human curse thesis from which we derived our political will approach. This position was arrived at from the fact that institutions and material resources do not and cannot have will of their own except the will inspired by and suffused with the human will.

Fifth, we brought out clearly in our review of the approaches that abundance/scarcity of resources, institution, leadership, human content, competency, knowledge management, dynamic capability, social organization, etc. are determined by political will based on the frame of mind in existence.

Sixth, we developed ten (10) propositions to be tested in future research towards validating our political will thesis for competent social organization.

Seventh, we identified following our perspective that in the practice of democracy, leaders with low uncertainty avoidance and weak power distance are more democratic, pragmatic, and struggle for and through self-reliance than leaders with high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance who practice democracy but not democratic in practical governance. We therefore argue that disciplined political will is the enabler of governance by self-reliance which in turn allow for economic inclusion requiring conceptual, technical, and human skills (Northouse, 2013).

Emerging from the preceding, there are few practical consequences from our analysis and the political will thesis proposed. First, there is the multifaceted relationship between political will and forms of social organization from the perspective of leadership and crisis management which of course does not exclude the political will of the followership to interrogate the leadership. Second, there is the need to appreciate the significance of struggling through self-reliance because it reinforces contemplation and commitment which compels new initiatives rather than reification and externalization of problems. Third, it is basic to understand that political will provides the role in how nations on a continual basis discover how they invent their reality and how they alter it, how it develops and expand its intellectual capabilities to creating a future that is self-assuring (Senge, 2004). Fourth, there is need to take serious in future research the reality that political will is immanent in all forms of administration, management, or leadership which requires the principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership.

Comparatively, studies have not really taken seriously the conceptualization of political will and its implications on competent social organization the manner in which we attempted here. It is a political will that touches on everything else as it reinforces various interactions, including the tendency to diminish and or to reinforce challenges. This observation points toward significant task for future research, this time an empirical one to validate these relationships. Future research should also make effort to see self-reliant political will as a crisis management strategy from political and economic perspective and whether democracy should be moderated to serve this goal which supposed universal values requires some research attention. It should be effortless for future research to examine the duo of resource curse and institutional curse theses and relate them to human curse thesis which we assume to and should take precedence over the other two.

Finally, future research could, if it merits research, carry out field research rather than the interrogative and illustrative methodologies influenced by our philosophical approach to conceptualizing political will which we adopted from few purposefully selected countries and leaders as a way of building on what we have done and what is to be done in future research.

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