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## **Traditional Rulers and the Art of War in Traditional Societies on the Eve of World War one (WWI): Case Study of FON Angwafo II of Mankon 1866-1920**

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### **Abstract:**

*War in traditional African societies on the eve of World War One (WWI) was fashioned by men of exceptional character and ability. The development of the art of war was a consequence of the conflicts that sometimes-characterized relationships between chiefdoms and kingdoms, and eventually colonial regimes. In the Fandom of Mankon, in the Grassfields region of the present-day Bamenda town Fon Angwafo II (1866-1920) was one of such men who was able to raise and coordinate a strong army of Mankon soldiers and created a system of military and diplomatic alliances to resist invasions by neighbouring kingdoms in alliance with European invaders. For example, in the famous battle of Mankon of 1891, the German-Bali troops were defeated. However, although Mankon was finally subdued and the German colonial rule established in a counterattack, Fon Angwafo II remains a figure like Samori Touré of the Mandinka Empire, as was acknowledged by Kaiser William I, the German Emperor. This work describes how an African leader was able to use his deep-rooted military and diplomatic skills to mobilize available human, strategic, and communication resources, to defend and secure the borders of his kingdom against attacks. In the first part of the work, we develop a theory of militarism. We then link up this theory to the theory of conflict, then test the theory using the experience of the Fon of Mankon and his military engagements with the Germans and their Bali ally.*

**Keywords:** *Fon Angwafo II, militarism, traditional diplomacy, traditional ruler, war/warfare, German-Bali-Mankon-Bafut, Bamenda grassfields*

### **1. Introduction**

The origin and development of the military is as old as the organization of mankind into groups. States emerge and survive in an environment in which hostilities and war occur as a matter of chance or provocation.<sup>1</sup> To avert and/or cope with war defined as organized violence; states developed defensive and offensive military systems and placed them under the command of able warlords or professional commanders. Studies of modern African military ought, we believe, to significantly benefit from the pre-Great War experiences.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore the purpose of this study to try to show why this is so and to achieve this we pose the following questions: How involved were traditional rulers in war on the eve of WWI? What role did they play in war in traditional societies before and its lessons for modern warfare since WWI?

To try to answer these questions, we make the point that traditional rulers were at the centre of the decision to go or not to go to war and for this they developed an organised warfare system. In other words, the art of war in traditional African societies on the eve of WWI was fashioned by men of exceptional character especially Fons or traditional rulers.

#### *1.1. Why do people go to war?*

There are principally two reasons why people go to war: first to defend them when attacked and second to invade and conquer others, whatever the motives. Ambitious rulers go to war to achieve a goal such as, to expand and enrich the fatherland. In traditional as well

<sup>1</sup> The idea of war as matter of chance or choice developed in N. Machiavelli's *The Discourse*, Bernard Crick, (Ed.), London, Penguin Classics, 1970, pp. 298-303.

<sup>2</sup>For a comparative study of the military in precolonial Africa, see Uzoigwe G.N. (1998) *The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa*. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, XII, 1-4. The University of Michigan. pp. 20-47. See also Bah, T. (1998). *Soldiers and 'Combatants': The Conquest of Political Power in Chad 1965-1990*. In Hutchful E. & Bathily, A. (Eds.), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA. Pp. 429-470.

as modern societies, wars of conquest were used to build Empires.<sup>3</sup> Ambitious rulers like Adolf Hitler of Germany and Fon Galega of Bali went to war to expand their territory.<sup>4</sup> The 19<sup>th</sup> century Chamba/Fulani raids in the Cameroon Grassfields of Bamenda partly motivated the quest for living space. In this type of war, the purpose is also to subjugate vanquished.

The second kind of war is defensive or resistance war usually conducted in defense of the fatherland. Such wars are to protect a people, their land and property from invaders. Early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, most groups in the Bamenda Plateau engaged in this type of war in the face of threats from Chamba/Fulani.<sup>5</sup> They were surrounded by fierce warriors: the Jukun, Bata, Chamba, Mbum, Vute and Tikar.<sup>6</sup> A fundamental consequence of the Chamba/Fulani raids of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was that they compelled the peoples of the Bamenda Grassfields, including the Mankon, to congregate in dense settlements protected by a system of deep moats and rivers or to find naturally protected sites in the mountains.<sup>7</sup> It was then that the Mankon confederation made up of five chiefdoms namely, Mankon, Njong, Mundum I, Mombu and Mbu was founded and created a common defensive settlement on the right bank of the Mezam. Another threat to the survival of the Mankon state under the leadership of Fon Angwafo II was the German penetration in the Bamenda Plateau and the subsequent German-Bali alliance.

Apart from these two types of war, another was war to fulfill engagements of military assistance. In this case, a group went to war in order to assist another to attack or defend them. Thus, the system of military alliance as was practiced in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was as well practiced among Grassfields groups well before the outbreak of WWI. In fact, when the first Great War broke out, the participation of the Africans and Cameroonians in particular on the side of any of the major belligerents was in the form of military assistance. Those Cameroonians who joined the battlefield did so with the belief that they were out to help a friend and not for the sake of any territorial expansion or protection per se.

Finally, a group went to war to intimidate its neighbours. Raids were perpetrated not only in search of slave labour and booty, but also to intimidate neighbours into paying tributes in all major commodities like grains, livestock, iron, and palm oil.<sup>8</sup> Among all the causes and types of war, this was the most uncommon for, when people went to war; they really did so to expand their territory, save it from attacks and/or assist another.

## 2. Fon Angwafo II as an Actor before WWI

### 2.1. Induction into the Art of War

This study focuses on the personality of Fon Angwafo II of the Kingdom of Mankon<sup>9</sup> who reigned for 54 years (1866-1920). He was the 20<sup>th</sup> Fon of the Kingdom who ruled during the period of German attempt to penetrate, explore, conquer and establish their administration in the Cameroon Grassfields and in Mankon in particular. This was also in the midst of attempts by hegemonic and ambitious Fondoms like the Bali to extend their hegemony over others. Unlike the Fon of Bali who accepted to negotiate with the Germans, Fon Angwafo II at the time was not ready for any negotiation that would have deprived the Fondom of Mankon of its sovereignty. That is why he was probably the 'only' ruler who tried to mount a stiff military resistance in a battle with the Germans and Bali in defense of the Mankon Fondom and in which he was successful.

Though very little is known about his childhood, Fon Angwafo II grew up in a hostile sociopolitical environment. During the reign of his father Fon Fomukong, in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the Chamba and Fulani raids provoked a stampede among the groups of the Grassfields to such an extent that defensive and offensive warfare became means of survival. During the reign of Fon Fomukong a defensive settlement was created and it was the challenge of Fon Angwafo II to oversee the preservation of this. This hostile environment moulded the Fon to become not only a fearless and wise King but also the military strategist, tactician, and diplomat that he became when he succeeded to the throne. Thus, the stampede provoked by the Chamba and Fulani raids began a process of induction into the art of war to the Fon and his people as young as he was at the time. They enabled him to build military and diplomatic skills that made him right and ripe enough to confront any hostility.

### 2.2. The Ideology of War of Fon Angwafo II

Fon Angwafo II (it must be recalled) grew up in a hostile environment under his father Fon Fomukong and his grandfather Fon Angwafo I who were said to have died during the struggle against the Chamba raiders. When he succeeded the throne, he had two

<sup>3</sup>Machiavelli, N. (1970). *The Discourse*. Bernard Crick, (Ed.), London: Penguin Classics. For more on the notion of war see Moran, D. (2001). *Strategic Theory and the History of War*. Naval Postgraduate School.

<sup>4</sup>*Lebensraum* is a Hitlerian 'slogan' meaning the quest for living space.

<sup>5</sup> For more on the development of this type of war in the Bamenda Plateau see, Nkwi, P.N. (1987). *Traditional Diplomacy: A Study of Inter-Chiefdom Relations in the Western Grassfields*, North West Province of Cameroon. Yaounde: Sopecam.

<sup>6</sup>Nkwi, P.N. & Warnier, J.P. (1982). *Elements for a History of the Western Grassfields*, Yaounde: Publication of the Department of Sociology. P.79.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.p.86.

<sup>9</sup>Mankon is the largest village among the three villages that make-up Bamenda town today. In the eyes of the Germans who were the first to penetrate the area, Mankon was half times bigger than Bali, its neighbour to the south. Situated in the north of Mezam, Mankon was a confederation at the time of Fon Angwafo II and remained so until the German administration was established. During the reign of Angwafo II, the population was about 6000. For details on people and history of Mankon, see Warnier, J.P. (1975). *Pre-Colonial Mankon: The Development of a Cameroon Chiefdom in its Regional Setting*. *PhD Thesis*. University of Pennsylvania.

major challenges: how to avenge the death of his predecessors and how to safeguard what they left, that is the Mankon confederacy, and its defensive settlement. Having grown in an environment of constant hostility he was quite aware that conflict was inevitable. He knew that conflicts were not over and that at any time war could break out. That is why he became suspicious of all neighbours particularly those of the Chamba origin like the Bali to whom he attributed the death of his father and grandfather. But with other neighbours like the Bafut he maintained relatively cordial relations. —a relationship that was nurtured by his predecessors. He was also prepared to use it to the advantage of the Mankon. He was wise not to make everybody around him his enemy or give the impression that he was their enemy.

Like his predecessors, Fon Angwafo II opted for a defensive ideology of war. In spite of the desire of vengeance that animated him and that could have caused him to launch an offensive war of revenge, the Fon preferred not to go to war. However, this gave the Fon a chance to fortify the defensive settlement. In doing so, he also kept relations of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence. Within the framework of his defensive war policy and in line with the idea of peaceful co-existence, the Fon opened up Mankon to her neighbours like the Nkwen with whom he signed a peace agreement.<sup>10</sup> Although it was not an agreement for mutual military assistance, it reflected his ability to strategically win an ally who could be of potential help in the event of war. The Fon also made a similar attempt at reconciling Mankon and Bafut. During part of the reign of Fon Achirimbi I of Bafut, relations with Mankon were conflictual because Mankon was accused of failing to respect an earlier agreement. When news of the arrival of Zintgraff the German explorer reached Mankon, the Fon of Mankon made efforts to make Bafut a permanent and strategic ally. Fon Angwafo II and Abumbi I of Bafut mutually agreed to form an alliance with the intention of defending their territory in the event of an attack.<sup>11</sup> The Fon also kept a relationship of peaceful co-existence with Fon Senge of Babungo Fondom for the self-same strategic reason. Among others, Mankon enjoyed mutually beneficial relations with Meta, Nsongwa, Mbutu, Nso and Awing. Bali was however the exception. Instead with Bali, there was mutual suspicion. As mentioned before, Bali proved to be a constant threat to the survival of groups of the area because of its hegemonic ambitions.

In a nutshell, the Fon's war policy is that being at peace with strategic neighbours is a military resource. The reason is that with peaceful co-existence there is some sense of military efficacy—the feeling that going to war with assistance from neighbours makes a difference.

### 3. The Mankon-German/Bali Wars and the Role of the Fon

The war between Mankon-Bafut on the one hand and German-Bali on the other was one of the last major wars on the eve of WWI. The Mankon people encountered the German-Bali armies three times. The first encounter also known as the Battle of Mankon was on January 31<sup>st</sup> 1891 and this was the most spectacular conflict in which Mankon, with the help of Bafut, was victorious.

#### 3.1. Precursors of and Preparations for the War

When we examined the ideology of war of Fon Angwafo II, we observed that Mankon was not on very good terms with Bali. Fon Angwafo II was at loggerheads with Fon Galega I of Bali. They did not give the same treatment to Zintgraff, the German explorer. Fon Galega I gave a 'red carpet reception' to Zintgraff and even signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the German. Fon Angwafo II who received Zintgraff in April 1889 was skeptical and indifferent because he did not trust Bali with whom the German had signed a 'Blood pact'. This was clear indication that Mankon was not prepared to enter any agreement that would jeopardize its independence. The cold reception of the German in Mankon gave an opportunity for the Bali to reinforce their friendship ties with the German and to easily convince Germany to go to war with Mankon, identified as a 'stubborn tribe'. It was in this context that Germans and Bali started preparations to attack the Mankon.

Bafut was in alliance with Mankon and like Mankon, failed to give a 'red carpet' welcome.<sup>12</sup> Bafut was accused of murdering two German-Bali messengers sent to Bafut to inform the Fon of the coming of Zintgraff.<sup>13</sup> After Zintgraff failed to negotiate for compensation with the Fon of Bafut, he returned to Bali, his 'second home' and convened a war council with the conviction that *only* force could bring the Mankon and Bafut under control. The war council was convened in the presence of the confidential servants of Fon Galega I and it took the decision to go to war against Mankon and Bafut to avenge the two servants killed on the road to Bafut. This was however a pretext to go to war, for, it was in fact the strategic objective of the Germans and Balis to establish control over the Grassfields groups even by force. During the war council, Zintgraff explained his war plans, strategies and tactics and requested ammunition reserved at Barombi to be brought up to Bali. Fon Galega I who had excitedly proclaimed his readiness for war and promised to support Zintgraff instructed his priests, magicians, diviners and some old women to make war magic. Chilver captures Galega and Zintgraff's intentions below:

<sup>10</sup> As a sign of the agreement, both parties buried a dog and planted a fig tree on their common border.

<sup>11</sup> Niba, M.L. (1996). *The Bafut and the Germans, 1889-1907*. In Chem-Langhëë B., & Fanso V.G. (Eds.), *Nso and its Neighbours: Readings in Social History*. Massachusetts: Amherst, p.92.

<sup>12</sup> Zintgraff himself reported that while in Bafut, his « impatience reached a climax when finally » the Fon "appeared". See Chilver, p. 100. For a detail of the treatment he was given in Bafut palace, see Suh I, N.F. (2007). *Fon Angwafo II of Mankon: A Traditional Ruler in a Hostile Political Environment (1866-1920)*. *Unpublished M.A. Dissertaion in the History of International Relations*. The University of Yaounde I: Department of History, p.39-41.

<sup>13</sup> Aletum, T.M. (1974). *Political Conflicts within the Traditional and Modern Institutions of Bafut-Cameroon*, Louvain: Vander, p. 85.

- ...Garega also saw beyond this and had found in the European outlook something worthy of respect 'war and force', Garega used to say "make people fear and empties the land, but land without people is like a burnt-out-fire". Consequently Garega [was] aiming to become the chief arbitrator of disputes between the neighbouring tribes. Consequently, he looks to European support to back up his influence...In order to make the man, his power and his efforts serviceable to [their] colonial interests, [Zintgraff] proposed in [his] programme the establishment of a Commissionership in Bali to which will be entrusted, as a main pre-occupation, the regulation of Garega's leadership and the establishment of a general administration for the Grassfields.<sup>14</sup>

The Fon of Mankon convinced the Fon of Bafut to join Mankon against German-Bali. Since the Germans and Bali failed to form an alliance with Bafut against the Mankon. So, it was not an easy task for Fon Angwafo II to win the confidence of Bafut. Bafut was instrumental in the war because strategically, it was the only possible gateway Zintgraff could use to reach the north. In addition, Bafut was a reliable trading partner with whom Zintgraff hoped to conclude another Bali-style alliance. After using a Mankon spy to secretly get information about German-Bali preparations for war, Fon Angwafo II dispatched an emissary with a request to the Fon of Bafut that they forget their past grievances and form a common front to withstand any German-Bali aggression. Fon Abumbi I of Bafut accepted and the two Fondoms were ready for war.

### 3.2. Fon Angwafo II Wins the Battle of Mankon

On 31<sup>st</sup> January 1891, the German-Bali forces attacked Mankon in what became known as the 'Battle of Mankon'. The manner in which Fon Angwafo II presented the war and was able to defeat combined German-Bali forces showed that leadership and military organisation of the Fondom made the difference.

#### 3.2.1. The Traditional Military and Security System

The military, security and its communications system were organised to meet armed confrontation. It was organised in eleven war lodges. Six were formed by Princes under the leadership of Royal cadets; two others were led by lineage heads, and two others for palace guards. Each war lodge had a specific assignment. For example, *Ndawarandzam* protected the Palace and the Fon while *Ndalale*, *Ndamandere*, *Ndanggang* and *Musongong* prepared attacks and captured the enemy. *Ndamusongong* was charged with the training of warriors. Youths were trained in target shooting known as *ma'funtontumkankang* and *ma'nukong*. War tactics and strategies were inculcated in a system of traditional wrestling and arm-to-arm combat that involved the use of sticks known as *fulam*. It was in *Ndamukong* or house of spears constructed by Fon Fomukong I that these youths were trained in warfare.

#### 3.2.2. Technology of War

Weapons used were *Mbamfulam*, sticks similar to those of the Fulani raiders, *Afu-atam*, slings used for throwing stones at the enemy, *Ngobntso*, war shields made of skins or tree backs, *Nukong*, spears with wooden handle for shooting at the enemy, *Nko*, a basket tied around the waist to contain stones for the *Afu-atam*, *Akoen*, moats used as bulwarks and *Ngaru*, dane guns.

Mankon established a system of communication for sending and receiving messages faster. The Fon trained special messengers and spies whose role was to collect information about the enemy. This communication system which was unknown to Zintgraff partly caused his demise and was also through it that the Fon was aware in time of the arrival of Zintgraff and his dealings with Fon Galega I of Bali. *Kweyn*, the talking drum was used to summon people to the palace for important announcements. *Me'* and *nubangna'ghag* were wooden horns used to call on warriors at the warfront to retreat and *Ntang* the horn of elephant tusk was used to announce the arrival of the Fon in the Palace or at the war front.

#### 3.2.3. Fon Angwafo II as Commander and Strategist

On 30<sup>th</sup> January 1891, the German-Bali forces left Bali at midday, pitched camp at Nsongwa where they spent the night and marched into Mankon on 31<sup>st</sup> January 1891. That was the start of the 'Battle of Mankon'. The troops comprised a flag bearer carrying a German tricolour flag, 100 Bali soldiers, 5 Germans with 300 Vai fighters and a rear-guard of 2000 men with dane guns and spears. Mankon warriors were waiting with dane guns, bows and arrows and tree-back shields. Fon Angwafo II instructed women, children and aged persons to evacuate the village and hide some kilometres away. He then, in one version of the story, instructed some soldiers to take position at strategic points around the village in a semi-circle until they received further instructions. All entrances into Mankon were blocked. He then dispatched a messenger to the Fon of Bafut to inform him that the war had started and urged that they join forces to defend their land with all that they inherited from their ancestors lest they shall be "condemned by posterity for being cowards and irresponsible".<sup>15</sup>

When the German-Bali forces commanded by Germans and two elderly sons of Fon Galega I Tita Nyi and Tita Mbo got into Mankon they found the palace empty. They started burning down houses and plundering the land when suddenly, Mankon and Bafut warriors came out from their hiding and launched an attack that surprised the enemy and forced her to retreat to Bangwa. This was an attack from ambush and was believed to have been caused by a Bali Vai said to have shot his gun on reaching Mankon. At one moment,

<sup>14</sup>Chilver, 1966, p.61.

<sup>15</sup>Eballa, Y. (1984). Some Notes on Zintgraff's Punitive Expedition against the Mankon People (Excerpts, Translations and Comments). In Eballa Y., & Aka A.A. (Eds.). *Focus on Nukwi Nii Fo Ndefru III: Mankon Cultural Festival 23<sup>rd</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1984*. Yaounde: Sopecam, p.38.

Mankon-Bafut forces retired westwards as if to surrender but it was in order to capture the northern wing of the German-Bali forces. The German-Bali forces were successfully forced out of Mankon territory and Zintgraff himself barely escaped death.

#### 4. The Aftermath of the War

In the 1891 military encounter, about 180 Bali and Vai were killed including 1000 vassals. Two Germans, Nehber and Huwe were killed including two others.<sup>16</sup> Galega I of Bali himself turned down Zintgraff's plans for a counter attack and Zintgraff barely escaped death. Mankon successfully proved to be a force to reckon with and Zintgraff's plan to strengthen Galega's paramouncy over Mankon was abandoned. The government in Berlin in turn suspended Zintgraff's expedition in the Grassfields and this was a political victory for traditional rulers. According to Zintgraff's report, Mankon suffered a total of 600 casualties.<sup>17</sup>

For ten years, Mankon enjoyed peace again. It was not until the punitive expedition of Lt. Col. Von Pavel that was organised at Tinto on November 5<sup>th</sup>, 1901 and ended in Mankon on December 20<sup>th</sup>, 1901 that Mankon was finally subdued. This expedition was one of the most important conducted against Cameroon judging from the size: 300 black soldiers armed with canons and two machine guns including 700 carriers. Again, Bali was the base for military preparation. Mankon troops numbered in thousands,<sup>18</sup> waited at a place called *shushue*. The German reprisal was harsh on the Mankon people who were forced to take cover in the bushes. But it was difficult to successfully launch an attack in the face of the machine guns and carrabines<sup>19</sup> deployed by the Germans. Pavel's report to Governor Von Puttkamer about the expedition sets the casualties as follows: 1062 Bafut casualties and 218 Mankon, 366 Bafut prisoners and 217 Mankon.<sup>20</sup> 17 Mankon prisoners were sent to Bali and 170 women and children to Tinto until a peaceful settlement was reached. Mankon was finally subdued in December 1901.

Although Mankon was finally subdued, Fon Angwafo II remains an outstanding personality as far as the politics and diplomacy of war were concerned. The Fon's courage was recognised not only by the neighbouring Fondoms, including Bali, but also by the German government in Berlin. In spite of its defeat the Fodom of Mankon was left as it was before the conquest and was not placed under the suzerainty of any Fon. The Fon of Bali himself surrendered plans proposed by Zintgraff to launch a counter attack on Mankon after the German-Bali defeat of 1891. Unlike the Fon of Bafut who was exiled as punishment for resisting the Germans, Fon Angwafo II was retained in recognition of his military and diplomatic skills which made him a convenient agent of administration.

The Fon received an official decoration from the German administration that consisted of the German tricolour flag, a resplendent steel amour of the Prussian guard, an eagle-crusted German crown, a portrait of Kaiser I William, a sword, four brass biggles and an official recognition as 'Kaiser of Kamerun'.<sup>21</sup> He was also allowed to keep an army of 100 militia men. To crown it all, his son, Prince Johaness Fru Mbah and his wife Maria Bih were taken to Wuttenberg in Germany and trained as teacher and mid-wife respectively.

Bali never succeeded to establish its hegemony as Galega I initially planned. Galega I even stopped plans for a counterattack on Mankon. Instead, Bali lost its status as German protégée particularly when the station was moved from there to Bamenda station, above Mankon and Bali became vulnerable.

The transfer of the German station from Bali to Bamenda "fort" was not only a consequence of the 1891 battle but also, an implicit recognition of the Fon's military capability. The military station or fort as it was sometimes called was strategically located above Mankon to oversee and control the Mankon people and their movements, so as to neutralise any attempt by the Fon to raise a new army and resume resistance against the Germans. The very position of the station shows that it was strategically selected.<sup>22</sup>

#### 5. Conclusion

This work described how an African leader was able to use his deep-rooted military and diplomatic skills to mobilize available human, strategic, and communication resources, to defend and secure the borders of his kingdom against attacks. It argued that traditional rulers like Fon Angwafo II of Mankon played an active military role in war and peace on the eve of WWI. Apart from the decision whether to go to war, they organised and commanded troops in a systemic manner. On January 31<sup>st</sup> 1891, a war broke out between Mankon and combined German-Bali forces in which Mankon, with the help of Bafut, was victorious. Although Mankon was finally subdued in 1901, after enjoying ten years of peace again, Fon Angwafo II remains an outstanding personality as far as the politics and diplomacy of war were concerned.

<sup>16</sup>Oral tradition holds that instead of surrendering to Mankon-Bafut, Tiedt and Von Spagenberg shot themselves with their revolvers.

<sup>17</sup>Chilver, E.M. (1966). *Zintgraff's Explorations in Bamenda, Adamawa and the Benue Lands, 1889-1892*. Buea: Government Printer, p.27.

<sup>18</sup>Temgoua, A.P. (2005). *Les Resistances à l'Occupation Allemande du Cameroun 1884-1916. Unpublished Thèse Doctorat d'Etat en Histoire*. Université de Yaounde I, p. 238.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. p.239.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.p. 241.

<sup>21</sup>These objects were found in the Mankon palace Museum at the time of this writing.

<sup>22</sup>The pioneer staff of the station comprised the following German military officers: Lt. Struempell who was chief of station, Lt. Von Gellhorn, warrant officer Baumann, Staum, Kaltenback, armourer Baehr and a medical officer who later joined the team.

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