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Globalization and Terrorism: Generalizing from the Nigerian Experience

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Abstract:

Societies globally are unsafe today following the unabating efforts of terrorist bands who undermine public peace through a host of violent strategies including hostage taking, massacres, suicide bombing, media propaganda and the deployment of high intelligence in the use of modern communications equipment in a psychological and violent warfare against unsuspecting third parties. The challenge here is how to prevent these from using information communication technology (ICT) since it is available and cheap to all. Though work acknowledges that one man freedom fighter is another man terrorist. The paper emphasizes the need for a unified data base system in Nigeria as options to combat the terrorism menace.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Globalization, Information Technology, violence, transnational crimes*

1. Introduction

Over the centuries, man has been troubled with concerns of war and terrorism and most especially now that there is increased trend of activities of several terrorists' organisations who are on the rampage globally. The phenomenon of terrorism dates back to 661 A.D., though its modern form emerged during the French Revolution of 1789-1799 when well over 40, 000 people were killed within a year. Terrorism as it is known today has assumed much notoriety and is arguably one of the biggest threats to global peace and security. Consequently, insecurity increased as terrorism assumed a steadier rise, with groups getting very well equipped, organized and coordinated today than even in the history of mankind (Laqueur, 2016); Kaplan, 2011; Pedahzur, 2006; Friedman, 2004)

Although analysts are divided on the reasons why men engage in war and terrorism, the work of Bandura (1978) shows that these terrorists are conditioned to fight through 'conversion of socialized individuals into effective military combatants' by virtue of a 'carefully conceived and executed training programme'. Accordingly, terrorists like soldiers are taught to believe that they are fighting a good cause, for a cherished way of life/moral values and for other high ideals such as defence of religion, freedom and lasting peace. Thus, they are completely reoriented from familiar civilian way by issuing them new, distinctive clothing and indoctrinating them with new beliefs and modes of behaving. They become familiarized with equipment and tactics that enable them to reduce fear in battle and enhance fighting solidarity, morale and co-ordination.

Meanwhile, systematic study of the psychological/biological impulses to aggression has, in recent years discarded the belief that a typical terrorist is waging war is doing so out of aggressive instinct or because of frustration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981). Undeniably, biological and psychological mechanisms within the individual which pertain to aggressive behaviours may feed or reinforce belligerent political attitudes that can cause violent conflict. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to conclude that innate biological and psychological factors are causes of war and terrorism.

Since the masterminded multiple attacks on the United States by the Al-Qaida international network in 2001, people have asked if terrorism will stop the process of globalization as the incidence of terrorism is compounded by the pervasive globalization phenomenon which is too dynamic to be ignored especially in the 21st century. The globalized milieu provides terrorists with an easy way to enter a foreign country and take hostage a country's nationals who are traveling abroad. Even the information communication technology (ICT) being a tool for modern advancement has been hijacked by terrorist bands to advance their own frontiers as they increase their capacity to undermine high level security alert, especially in weak and failing states (Zahri & Syahrul, 2015).

To execute the task ahead this work structurally is collapsed into five segments, and takes off with the introduction. The second segment dwells on the understanding of terrorism and globalization, while the third identifies and establishes the nexus between terrorism and globalization. The fourth segment discusses the geopolitical location of Nigeria in the global affairs and ICT as option in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria before moving to the concluding segment and recommendations.

2. Definitions and Conceptual Discourse

2.1. Terrorism

"Terrorism" etymologically originated from the French word '*terrorisme*' which means 'to frighten' or 'tremble' and involves complex threats and use of violence. In many cases, terrorists intentionally choose to attack innocent targets to press their political and or moral/religious demands from the government or people with which they are in conflict even while violating domestic and international laws in the process (White, 2003; Chomsky, 2001).

Though this phenomenon has been widely interrogated in the extant literature, there is no precise and universally accepted definition. According to Khatchadourian (1998) some of the definitions are either too broad or too narrow; others are too restrictive and limited to a form of terrorism. Some do not even contain the necessary characterization of the term, others are condemnatory and beg for ethical issues, or fail to capture the characterization of terrorism because they are either overtly or covertly normative rather than as definitions ought to be, neutral or non-evaluative. This is so in the view of Wolfang (1982) because acts that convey terrorist impressions are often viewed from different perspectives; hence the cliché that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. In 1999 Walter Laqueur had counted over 100 definitions of terrorism and concludes that the only characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves, violence and the threat of violence (Laqueur, 2003). Even the United Nations (UN) has varied views, captured in 12 existing multilateral conventions on terrorism. None of these, is precise and acceptable by member states as various states hold divergent views of what constitute terrorism. The first attempt to define the phenomenon was with the League of Nations in 1937, though the stature did not see the light of the day. However, between then and 1994 several attempts were advanced, particularly on December 9, 1994, the General Assembly Resolution 49/60 on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism saw terrorism as:

- Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons for political purpose are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the consideration of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

The limitation of this advancement was obvious following the 9/11 events. Thus, the UN eventually broadened the scope of her definition in Resolution 1566 of 2004 to include:

- Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause deaths or serious bodily injury or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

While the UN could not provide a universally acceptable definition, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now Africa Union (AU) in 1999 and later in a supplementary document in 2004 on the Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism article (a) (1-3) defines terrorism as any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

1. Intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or
2. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
3. Create general insurrection in a State.

Scholars such as Burton Leiser opine that the terrorism involves:

- Any organized set of acts of violence designed to destroy the structure of authority which normally stands for security, or to reinforce and perpetuate a governmental regime whose popular support is shaky. It is a policy of seemingly senseless, irrational, and arbitrary murder, assassination, sabotage, subversion, robbery and other forms of violence, all committed with dedicated indifference to existing legal and moral codes or with claims to special exemption from conventional social norms (Leiser, 1979).

The definitions above present several dimensions of the phenomenon. Khatchadourian (1998) instead of giving a formal definition explains that the core meaning of terrorism includes the notion that terrorist acts are acts of coercion or force aiming at monetary gain (predatory terrorism), revenge (retaliatory terrorism), a political end (political terrorism), or a punitive moral/religious end (moralistic/religious terrorism). He further noted on the morality of terrorism in all its forms is always wrong as it disregards the principles of just war, necessity, proportion and discrimination. It also violates human rights. Unfortunately, these terrorists assume the place of judges and jurists at the same time in meting punishment on their victims.

Khatchadourian in his *Morality of Terrorism* identifies five basic elements of which an adequate description of terrorism must include. They are the historical and cultural, including the socioeconomic root causes of its prevalence; the immediate, intermediate and long range or ultimate goals, forms and methods of coercion and force generally resorted to terrorize the immediate victims and to coerce those who are seriously affected by the terrorism, the victimized; the nature and kinds of organizations and institutions, or the political systems, practicing or sponsoring the terrorism and the social, political, economic or military context or circumstances in which the terrorism occurs is also important and must be considered. The notion that terrorists create fear is in tandem with an ancient Chinese saying that encapsulates the central idea "kill one, [to] frighten ten thousand" (Schmid, 2005; Ruby, 2002).

2.1.1. The Pervasive Nature of Terrorism

Over the years terrorists have perfected the creation of confusion and psychological fears on the unsuspecting publics globally as they perpetuate acts of violence with large scale mortality. The sole aim of these individuals and organisations being to kill and destroy. Surprisingly, many did not know of the transnational dimension of terrorism until the shocking experience of the September 11, 2001 christened 9/11 when nineteen Islamic extremists hijacked four planes. They directed and crashed two of the planes into the World Trade Center in New York, destroying the twin towers. In the process, an estimated three thousand people were killed. A third was directed at the headquarters of the United States America's Department of Defence -the Pentagon- killing nearly two hundred workers, while the fourth crashed into a rural southwest Pennsylvania after the passengers over powered the terrorists (Feith, 2008; Abraham, 2006; White, 2003). The American President at that time, George W. Bush called the incident "an act of war" similar to the Japanese military surprise attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in the morning of December 7, 1941 (Kean, 2004). Since then the United Nations (UN) Security Council has intensified efforts at counter-terrorism globally. For instance, the UN Resolution 1373 globalized the fight against terrorism and obligated all 191 UN member States to take far reaching domestic legislative and executive actions in order to prevent and suppress future terrorist activities. Unfortunately, nowhere can it be said that terrorists have been completely rooted out (Spence, 2012; Pappas, 2010; Oudraat, 2004; Cass, 2004).

Schmid (2005) note that terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method by semi-clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. He identifies the key characteristic elements to include the demonstrative use of violence against human beings; the threat of (further) violence; the deliberate production of terror/fear/dread/anxiety in a target group; the frequent targeting of civilians, non-combatants, and innocents; the purpose of intimidation, coercion, and/or propaganda; the fact that it is a method, tactic, or strategy of conflict waging; the importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to a larger audience; the illegal, criminal, and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; the predominantly political character of the act; and its use as a tool of psychological warfare.

2.1.2. Terrorist Organisations in Africa

The African continent has since the 1990s witnessed the emergence of deadly terrorist organizations that rampage the landscape. What all these have amounted to is that Africa and indeed the world is sitting on a gun powder ready to explode if urgent efforts are not taken to nib the problem in the bud. Among the most prominent groups are summarized in the table below:

Group	Location	Year of emergence
al Shabab (emerged from the youth wing of the defunct Union of Islamic Courts)	Somalia	2006
The Lord's Resistance Army	Uganda	
Boko Haram ("Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad")	Nigeria	2010
Ansar al-Muslimin in the Lands of the Blacks (JAMBS) also known as Vanguarders for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, or simply Ansaru, a splitter group from the Boko Haram.	Nigeria	
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The AQIM is a North African wing of Al-Qaeda, formally known as the Algerian Sakafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) after the collapse of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Algeria	1995
Ansar Dine " <i>Harakat Ansar al-Dine</i> " ("movement of defenders of the faith")	Algeria	2012
The Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA), a split group from Ansar Dine	Mali	January 2013
The National Movement Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) , (Tuareg group which pursues the independence for Azawad people)	Mali	2014
the "Signed in Blood" Battalion	Algeria	2012
the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)	Mali	2011
the "Masked Men" Battalion and the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (splitter groups of AQIM regrouped under the new name El-Mourabitoun)	Mali	2011
The Sons of the Islamic Sahara Movement for Justice (split group from MUJAO)	northern Niger, western Libya and south-eastern Algeria	May 2013

Table 1: Major Terrorist groups in Africa

Source: Olomjobi, 2015; Bapat, 2012

In almost all cases, their attacks are typified by surprised aggression, brutal militancy and clandestinism. In terms of specific strategies, terrorists have globally adopted the following as means of executing their diabolical designs: arson, mass killing by gunfire, suicide bombing, use of improvised explosives, hijacking and blowing of aircraft and ship; car bombing of strategic places; murder and assassination; biological and chemical warfare; massacres, kidnapping and hostage-taking (most time bargaining with lives of hostages); media propaganda and advocacy; piracy; jail break; forced enlistment/recruitment of combatants; identity theft, fraud and money laundering. They deliberately attack civilian population, police, military and other security agencies coupled with massive

destruction of government facilities and civil properties like oil installations, police stations, prisons, shops, worship centres (mosques and churches) (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014; Walton, 2014; Eselebor, 2011).

Nimosha (2014) establishes that there are many driving forces why this phenomenon exists. Emmanuel (2015); Bogere, Faruque & Mohammad(2013) argue that whatever reasons that are advanced the impact on the mostly civilian populace who are their victims are enormous.

2.2. Globalization

Like terrorism, many scholars and organisations have offered several definitions. Most of the definitions contain similar issue of reality. It is equally important here to note that that globalization is not a new phenomenon. The antecedents of modern globalization are rooted in history and has become one of the most challenge that the international system experience (Orngu, 2014). With globalization as it is known today, societies are increasingly becoming interdependent. The number of international organizations and their power are increasing, and global communication have become widespread and almost instantaneous (Rouke, 2004).

The collapse of the bi-polar politics of the East and West, gradually pushed the world into a 'global village'. This collapse which brought about a new configuration introduced a multi-polar system with advanced technology has come with its positive as well as negative sides (Waltz, 2000). The rise in organized transnational crimes including terrorism is attributed to globalization, with several non-state actors that have threatened peace and security globally (Eselebor, 2012; Oshanugor, 2007; Peters 2003). The truth is that globalization presents a clash of culture. This in itself creates a serious identity problem which the extremists oppose.

Friedman (2004) notes that globalization is simply the integration of everything with everything else, but a more complete definition is that "globalization is the integration of markets, finance, and technology in a way that shrinks the world from a size medium to a size small". This enables mankind today to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before.

No doubt, the gains are enormous, however, as much as globalization has increased international economic liberalization, volume of trade and financial flows, it has also magnified and facilitated the easy movement of 'dirty money' as well as trans-border transportation of illicit drugs, counterfeit goods, arms, illegal aliens, people with extreme agenda and nuclear materials and knowledge (World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 2004).

Though globalization may not be the main cause of organized crime, it is the main facilitator of the rapid proliferation of such international crimes. For instance, the 9/11 attack was a complex international operation and a product of many years of planning (Kean, 2004).

3. Linking the phenomenon of Terrorism and Globalization

Terrorists have taken advantage of this advancement of the 21st century. It is common knowledge that terrorists around the world use technology to conduct their nefarious trade against the civilized world, for its ability to improve communication and aid organization (Feith, 2008; Indrajit, 2008; Keen, 2004). They now use the internet for recruiting, promoting propaganda, gathering of information, publication of training materials, communications, preparation of real-world attacks, terrorist financing. As Cronin (2003) noted "the wave of international terrorism is not only a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it".

Terrorists now plan and communicate with encrypted data even beyond law enforcement's ability to intercept or decode their data, in addition, to the use of disposable cellular phones, over the counter long-distance calling cards, internet cafes (Oluwafemi, Adesuyi, Abdulhamid, 2013; Michael, 2013; Veerasamy and Grobler, 2011). This was corroborated by a suspected Boko Haram member who served as a computer analyst of the group that was apprehended by the Nigerian security agents. He noted as cited in Osho et al (2013) that ICT particularly the social media was the fastest way to disseminate information and propagate their ideology. He also confessed that transfer of financial transactions was made easy.

The group is said to have militant structures in most states of the north and with well-established links with major terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Al-Shabaab. This is made possible as a result of ICT facilities (Punch, Dec. 31, 2014). One of the Chairmen of Senate Committee on ICT had had cause while addressing a high-powered delegation to lament what he termed "embarrassing quietness from ICT sector in Nigeria on the fight against terrorism (Emmanuel, 2015). While the Boko Haram insurgents use guerilla war strategy, communicate through the phones, and have internet presence as they use the email, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and issues press releases online. But, no matter how careful there should be trails through their log calls, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses etc. That traces are left should be the concern of counter-terrorism strategies (Okereke, 2013).

At least an average Nigerian uses a mobile phone. According to the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) (2015), there are 152,003,124 active lines. In its November 2015 monthly subscriber's data, it was noted that 149,787,120 were active numbers subscribed to the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) network services, while the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) operators had 2,149,120 active users and Fixed Wired/Wireless networks' consumers 186,775. With this whooping data, Nigeria has the largest mobile market on the continent of Africa with about 90 percent of individuals and corporate organizations relying on the mobile industry for their daily transactions and shows a rapid growth in the use of modern communication technology (Nwanga et al, 2015). Meanwhile, billions of dollars have been invested in Nigeria's mobile industry resulting in the construction and deployment of additional base stations, fiber optic networks and various other infrastructure components (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). But the tendency to abuse is also very high. In a computer crime as well as cyber survey conducted by Background Check International indicated that Nigeria is the most internet fraudulent country in Africa. Besides, the same report stated that Nigeria is ranked third among others identified with cyber fraud and computer crime in the world (Ibikunle and Eweniyi, 2013).

Emmanuel, 2015); Okereke, 2013) corroborate that the Boko Haram insurgents have come to utilize high technology in their operations especially the mobile phones. In response, the Nigerian military in the wake of the state of emergency declared in May

2013 and part of its counterinsurgency operation against the Boko Haram insurgents ordered the shutting down of mobile phones for seven days in the area. The intention was to debar the terrorists from communicating, regrouping and reinforcing. According to Adeyemi, Joel and Tsenzughul (2012) in a raid on the home of one of the suspected Boko Haram leaders by the Nigerian military over 54 assorted GSM SIM cards were recovered. Unfortunately, most of the cards were pre-registered.

4. The Geo-Political Location of Nigeria

Nigeria holds a strategic place in Africa and the international community with its large population and natural economic endowment (Osaghae, 2011; Coleman, 1984). Nigeria has played pivotal roles in terms of politics and security stabilization and prosperity of nations in West Africa and beyond. More than one quarter of the Black world over are Nigerians. Yet, security challenges occasioned by Boko Haram, a violent Islamic movement committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and Jihad, based in Northeastern Nigeria with the aim to establish a caliphate has ravaged that part of Nigeria since 2010. This domestic challenge with international dimension has been daunting even as the trend has acquired new intensity. There have been incidences of high profile kidnapping of westerners along the Lake Chad Basin up to Northern Cameroon, large scale destruction of property belonging to governmental institutions and loss of thousands of innocent lives in the process as the group try to live out its Hausa translation- western education is sin. This has gross implications for national security (Akpan, Ekanem and Olufu-Adeoye, 2014). According to a Daily Times of Nigeria report of April 23, 2015 an estimated 20,000 people have been killed and over 2.3 million internally displaced from their homes in three Northeastern states namely Adamawa, Yola and Borno since the emergence of the group.

Consequently, the Government of the United States designated the Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224 on November 14, 2013. Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar Adam Kamar leaders of the group were hunted by the United States Department's Rewards for Justice program that published a reward of up to US \$7 million for anyone with leading information about their whereabouts in June 2013 (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217532.htm>). Nigeria thus was blacklisted by the United States government as one of the 14 nations whose nationals would be singled out for special checks at their entry points (Rudner, 2015). In its 2013 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the Institute of Economics and Peace ranked Nigeria 4th behind Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. That year alone, Nigeria witnessed 303 terrorist attacks with 1,826 fatalities and 457 injuries. On the other hand, Nigeria was ranked 151 out of 162 nations on the Global Peace Index in comparative perspective. Nigeria's Boko Haram ranks next to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Afghan Taliban and the International Al-Qaida affiliated networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2013).

Unfortunately, the Nigeria government alone cannot fight the menace especially using the military force given its politicization and huge corruption accusation associated within the ranks and file of both civilian and military circles. Even though, the government quarters have frequently claimed that they were winning the war on terror, it has become daily news that these terrorists make successful incursions and even annex territories to themselves in their bid to establish Islamic caliphate. In the process, 22 of 27 local government areas of Borno state slipped into their hands in their bid to declare an Islamic caliphate in Gwoza on 6 August 2014. Though on 8 August, 2014 the Nigerian Army freed Gwoza, the message about the group's intention to expand their hold had been established. The group's onslaughts are too numerous to chronicle but include the suicide bomb explosion of UN building and the Police Headquarters in Abuja, bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, Baga Massacre, and the abduction of hundreds of girls from the Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno State in April 2014 leave bad memories (Omilusi, 2016; Ibrahim, 2015; Olomajobi, 2015). Of course, another denting of the battered image of Nigeria was the attempt on December 24, 2009 by Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab also known as the 'underwear bomber' to bomb an airplane on board 253 bound for Detroit from Amsterdam with explosives sewn in his underwear, supposedly given to him by a terror cell operating in Yemen. Abdul Mutallab was linked to Al-Qaeda global network. Though the incident was unsuccessful and foiled by vigilant passengers, it brought to the fore the transnationalization of terror networks and their deployment of unsuspected agents globally. This incidence if it had succeeded would have been the most devastating attack on America next to the 9/11 attack (Eselebor, 2011; Campbell, 2010).

To compound the problem, it seems the government of Nigeria is encumbered with so much political issues and has left the needful. The land borders especially in the Northeast from the stretch of long porous routes with over 1,000 illegal entry points at the borders of Niger Republic and Cameroon through Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states make ease for weapons and human movement (Akindele and Akinterinwa, 2011; Ate and Akinterinwa, 2011; Agboton-Johnson, Ebo and Mazal, 2004). In addition, terrorism thrives because of its badly divided nature; imbalance in societal configuration; bad colonial legacies; decades of military oppression/institution of terror. All of these situations made Nigeria's former President Goodluck Jonathan to say that:

- The emerging dimension of threat to national security that is rearing its ugly head in our nation must be confronted headlong and defeated. The spate of violent crimes in parts of the country including kidnapping, armed robbery, assassinations etc. are contemporary security challenges facing our nation (Goodluck Jonathan cited in Soriwei & Fidelis, (2010:1).

4.1. ICT as option in the 'War of Terror' in Nigeria

Adekanye (2007) noted that counter terrorist strategies and policies particularly those relying on the use of purely military means, tend to backfire on states, regimes or governments that pursue them. The inadequacy of the use of military force alone for dealing with what is basically a political, economic, social and psychological problem; and the boomerang effects that such a strategy tends to produce. The argument here is not that military force has no role to play in the combating of terrorism, for the removal of the Taliban regime that harbored Al-Qaida in Afghanistan since 1996 would not have been possible. The collaboration of the US with other nations in October 2001 resulted in the overthrow and replacement of the Taliban regime and a number of suspected training sites

belonging to Osama bin Ladan and his Al Qaeda organization were destroyed, even hundreds of his armed men were captured and taken prisoners. But, only reliance on military force as a counterterrorist strategy has the tendency of driving the more fundamental factors and forces fueling terrorism underground. Thus, new paradigms are advanced in this paper to curtail the menace of terrorism in Nigeria.

The difficulty in the fight against terrorism has mainly been that it is a fight carried out in secrecy. To fight against terrorism, functional ICT education, security personnel need to become paramount not just at lips service, the use of closed circuits television cameras for surveillance of public places, creation and use of unified national identity and biometric database management system need to be urgently done not just in silos as the case has been in Nigeria over the years, use of facial recognition technology, use of lawful interception of information of suspected person or persons which can be within the premise of Freedom of Information Bill which has been with the National Assembly for years and protection of communication networks with firewall. Furthermore, legislation on terrorism is still at infant stage in most African countries. It will seem to be that until the problem is at hand and damage has been done no one seem to be ready to prepare for the future. Today Nigeria is rigmarolling in terrorism quagmire without strong legislation to fight it.

As part of the government's counter-insurgency measures, a state of emergency was declared in May 2013 in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. The military took advantage of the declaration to shut down mobile networks in those states between May 23 and July 12, 2013. This drastic measure was the first time the government would deny citizens access to the use of the ICT. In addition, they also have been compelled to rely on enhancing technologies to tap phone lines of suspected terrorists and their backers. One way to get this achieved was that the federal government in 2011 mandated the NCC to register all mobile phones in the country, the objective being to enhance the security of the state through the SIM registration exercise. This was successful, and all unregistered lines were deactivated from their networks. With this exercise, key terrorists namely Sani Mohammed, Kabir Sokoto and Shuaib Mohammed Bama were apprehended by the military in 2012. Consequently, the Nigeria military successfully blocked the terrorists' access to the use of mobile phone in three of the most affected northeastern states on May 23, 2013. The intension was limit Boko Haram communications, restrict their ability to regroup and ability to detonate improvised explosive devises(Jacob and Apkan, 2015).

Jacob and Apkan(2015) further informs that the NigeriaPolice, for example, deployed an alternative mobile communication system using Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) on Global Open Trunking Architecture (GOTA) from the Chinese manufacturer ZTE. Since it was only GSM lines that were blocked, it was possible for the police to use CDMA with ease. The GOTA phones were distributed to police officers in northeastern Nigeria just before the mobile phone shutdown. This enabled the police, along with other state security units, to circumvent the shutdown.

According to Okereke(2013)other areas where successes could be achieved in the using ICT in the include the use of intrusion detection devices, Cordoning off Critical Information and Communication Infrastructures and staging round the clock surveillance to check mating attacks on ICT infrastructure. Other high-tech gadgets that will also aid the fight of insecurity include the use of extremely selective, sensitive Explosive Detectors that must be able to sniff out trace amounts and distinguish a real explosive from the 'noise' of other compounds, Automatic Number Plate Recognition System, an encompassing National Database & Fingerprint of Convicted Criminals, Wired/Wireless and Internet Protocol Networked Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Cameras, Use of Satellite-Based Technology in Security-monitoring Crude Oil Pipelines, critical national infrastructures and our extensive borders.

More strategies is in a range of policy tools and techniques which Adekanye (2007) advanced are improved collaboration among the security organizations of nations, gathering intelligence, enhancing security measures at sea, land and air ports, denying entry to suspected terrorists, improving extradition procedures, imposing tougher immigration and visa requirements, interment or preventive detention measures, trails and imprisonment of terrorist, economic sanctions against known or suspected terrorist organizations, targeted assassinations, pre-emptive military strikes against known or suspected terrorist training sites or camps, use of military force or even going to war with states suspected of harboring or sponsoring terrorist organization.

However, the problems confronting the government in combating terrorism are enormous. In spite of the actions put in place to suppress terrorism, the menace seems to be over stressing the government. Hence, it is the view of this paper that to overcome terrorism, those fighting against it must review their strategies and goals. Global fight against terrorism requires a concerted effort as containment. Duke (2014) states two reasons as part of the challenges that ICT has faced within Nigeria which are low level of ICT skills among security personnel and lack of Government Commitment. Although, he opined that the ranking of Nigeria by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for ICT use and skill is at a whopping 122th out of 155 selected economies in the world and the colossal 6th position on military funding in Africa as at 2012 yet the impact is nothing to be commended.

There are more impediments as observed by the Chairman, Senate committee on ICT. There is an embarrassing quietness from the ICT sector in the fight against insecurity posed by rising spade of terrorism. The question then is "whose role is it to deploy ICT to combat terrorism". Though it is clear that government should put its "hands" where its "mouth" and "money" is, this level of commitment is not there as evident in the National Conference that was held in 2014. This is because against the outcry of the Nigerian Computer Society that it was ready to participate, the government never provided a slot for ICT practitioners (Emmanuel, 2015).

5. Conclusion

Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy has been largely military which in a way is limited, itself based on the wrong diagnosis of what constitutes terrorism. Though, the adoption of largely military strategy is because terrorism is seen as a violent conflict which must be matched with violent force. This is evident in the colossal amount Nigeria spends on military weaponry. While some may say that the

government's efforts in this regard is commendable, more work still needs to be done. Meanwhile, for the security situation to be managed it is the joint responsibility of the Nigerian government and citizens.

6. Recommendations

The lack of coordination between Government, Security agents and the ICT sector is detrimental to the fight against terrorism. However, the following would go a long way in the fight against terrorism:

- i. The government should adopt a functional national unified data base system. Since most of data are presently available in different silos deposited in the operating financial institutions in Nigeria; the telecommunications networks; National Drivers' License Scheme; National Identity Card Scheme; Permanent Voters Card; etc. If these are synchronized, then a click of the button would provide necessary data and location of a person for information seekers. This would make the use of wearing identity card meaningful. Some developed countries such as Portugal, France, Belgium, Denmark have adopted the wearing of ID cards for their citizens.
- ii. The various telecommunication companies should properly educate Nigerians on the dangers of improper disposal of their GSM vouchers. As these could be used as a decoy by fleeing terrorists.
- iii. The Nigerian government in collaboration with the GSM operators should ensure that phone users not only register their SIM cards but that they use verifiable names and contacts. The SIM card registration if properly monitored would serve as a means of identifying those who engage in terrorist communication. Thus, those who misplace their SIM cards should endeavor to block them immediately before pursuing another line.
- iv. The federal government should collaborate with car manufacturers and distributors to get them track funders of these terrorist groups by pinning them down with the chassis and car registration numbers. Thus, terrorists and their funders could be apprehended through vehicles registration number and chassis number:
- v. Nigerians should endeavour to get and utilize the emergency numbers of the Nigeria Police, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Immigration Service, and other agencies involved in security of lives and property in the various states and report any suspected terrorist's movements for immediate intervention.

7. References

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